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ABSTRACT
Law will determine the future of the planet.  Net metering, the regulatory
mechanism employed by 88% of U.S. states to promote renewable power 
and to reduce carbon emissions from electricity production, is now legally 
challenged. The legality of recent carbon control policies is expected to 
head to the Supreme Court.
The law governing electric power, and electric power itself, is distinct
from everything else.  The physics of electricity do not align with the law.
Electric power, alone among all forms of energy, is the only energy which 
cannot be stored:  The supply of power produced must instantaneously 
second-by-second exactly match the demand for power, or the power grid
collapses as it did in the eastern U.S. in 2003. Rapidly expanding use of
intermittent net metered solar and wind sources pose a new concern for 
the maintenance of a reliable and stable power grid.
Well-established precedent requires equitable and precise allocation of 
the costs of every power transaction.  Without states undertaking this cost
analysis and setting rates, there is a missing legal link.  Only two of the
forty-four states that employ net metering of renewable power have done 
this analysis. Without doing so, the other forty-two states leave their 
primary climate change policies and renewable energy incentives vulnerable 
to challenge and reversal as soon as those states enact them.
This Article examines the legal and physical differences between 
electricity and everything else that the law addresses.  This Article navigates 
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the legal “trip wires” around power, dissecting the disparate renewable
power net metering policies in 41 states. We “follow the money” to examine 
who directly benefits and who indirectly  pays for net metering, as a 
matter of law, and how this affects this cutting edge of government policy.
States are now challenged on their net metering policies.
Legal vulnerabilities in major policies require solutions:  States can,
but most haven’t yet taken the steps to, immunize their renewable energy
programs against legal challenge.  This is critical to meaningfully address 
climate change. This Article’s final sections map a legal solution and 
chart the missing legal link.
I. “THIS SIDE UP” 
To effectively arrest rapid world climate change, the U.S. must quickly 
mitigate carbon emissions from electric power that contribute to runaway
global warming.1  Net metering, the principal regulatory mechanism 
employed in the U.S. to promote renewable power to reduce carbon
emissions from electricity,2 now is challenged as inefficient and inequitable3 
in subsidizing the use of power by the most affluent.4  With regulation of
carbon emissions now stayed by the Supreme Court and the challenge
expected to arrive again at the Supreme Court,5 the law must determine 
which side is up.
 1. Overview of Greenhouse Gases, U.S. EPA, http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/ 
ghgemissions/gases/co2.html [https://perma.cc/RE87-QS24] (last visited May 30, 2016). 
2. Net metering is provided in forty-four U.S. states, which is 88% of all states, 
and is thus the most widespread and robust renewable incentive in any country in the 
world. 
3. See infra Section V.
 4. See infra Section VI.A.
 5. See infra Section IV.A.2 for a discussion of the administration’s Clean Power 
Plan.  Jocelyn Durkay, Net Metering: Policy Overview and State Legislative Updates, 
NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/research/energy/net-metering­
policy-overview-and-state-legislative-updates.aspx [https://perma.cc/8MUS-EST7] (last 
updated Dec. 18, 2014). 
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Globally, the U.S. and 191 other world governments that signed the
Kyoto Protocol6 have arrived at a critical “tipping point.”7  The United 
Nations forecast a coming “tipping point[] . . . that will alter regional and 
global environmental balances . . . irreversib[ly] within the time span of 
our current civilization.”8 According to Dr. John Holdren, Director of the
White House Office of Science and Technology Policy, if U.S. greenhouse 
emissions somehow plateaued in 2015, we would already have reduced 
by 50% our chance of any policy avoiding climate catastrophes.9  And 
global greenhouse emissions increased in 2015, rather than plateauing or
receding. 
Whether or not the world “tips” is linked to electric power:  “The electric
power sector offers the most cost-effective opportunities to reduce CO2 
emissions,” compared to transportation and all other sectors.10  Before
tipping into Dr. Holdren’s precipice, two of the three primary mechanisms
for a transition to renewable power—renewable portfolio standards and
feed-in tariffs—have been successfully challenged in the form adopted by 
several U.S. states as unconstitutional pursuant to, respectively, the
Commerce Clause and Supremacy Clause of the Constitution.11  This leaves
one mechanism, net metering, as the predominant legal tool to transition 
6. The United States signed, but never ratified the Kyoto Protocol. In 2012, 
Canada, Russia, New Zealand, and Japan either withdrew or ceased being bound in the 
current phase of the Protocol.  Status of Ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, U.N. FRAMEWORK 
CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, http://unfccc.int/Kyoto_protocol/status_of_ratification/
items/2613.php [https://perma.cc/F6AH-TEGZ] (last visited May 30, 2016); Associated 
Press, U.N. Climate Conference Adopts Kyoto Extension, CBS NEWS (Dec. 8, 2012, 3:16 
PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/un-climate-conference-adopts-kyoto-extension [https:// 
perma.cc/2DYA-KSKR].  As of November 2015, New Zealand accepted the Doha Amendment 
to the Kyoto Protocol.  Doha Amendment of the Kyoto Protocol, U.N. TREATIES COLLECTION, 
https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVII-7-c&chapter
=27&lang=en [https://perma.cc/S9BE-GZ72] (last visited May 30, 2016). 
7. Dean Scott, NASA Scientist Recalls 1988 Testimony by Seeking Phaseout of 
Coal-Fired Plants, 39 ENV’T REP. (BNA) 1273 (June 27, 2008). 
8. New Science and Development in Our Changing Environment, 2009 U.N. 
ENV’T PROGRAMME Y.B. 21, U.N. Doc. UNEP/GC.25/INF/2, http://www.unep.org/yearbook/ 
2009 [https://perma.cc/JVL9-L7DX]. 
9. Robin Chase, Get Real on Global Warming Goals, BOS. GLOBE, Apr. 22, 2008, 
at A15. 
10. Energy Estimates Show Rise in CO2 Emissions, Offer Mitigation Options, CARBON 
CONTROL NEWS, July 2, 2008, LEXIS. 
11. See Steven Ferrey et al., Fire and Ice: World Renewable Energy and Carbon 
Control Mechanisms Confront Constitutional Barriers, 20 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F.
125, 127 (2010); Steven Ferrey, Threading the Constitutional Needle with Care: The
Commerce Clause Threat to the New Infrastructure of Renewable Power, 7 TEX. J. OIL 
GAS & ENERGY L. 59, 86–89, 98 (2012); Steven Ferrey, The Double Helix of Supremacy
and Commerce Clause Constitutional Restraints Encircling the New Energy Frontier, 7 
NW. INTERDISC. L. REV. 1, 4–6 (2014). 
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to renewable energy in the United States.  Net metering also is the fastest
increasing policy tool used to promote world renewable energy.12 
However, net metering is now under significant pressure in several of
the 88% of U.S. states which deploy it, as an imprecise legal mechanism 
and a failure of legal regulators to calculate a proper rate determination.13 
The climate stakes are significant because net metering is the key U.S. 
policy to urgently address climate change.14  With challenges to other U.S. 
policies on climate change now heading toward the Supreme Court,15 we 
examine the net metering tension. 
This Article sets forth the law and reveals that among the forty-four 
U.S. states implementing energy net metering, see Figure 1, only two state
energy regulatory commissions have done the required analysis to establish a 
legally supportable tariff for net metering.  Without undertaking this analysis, 
a missing legal link leaves this primary policy vulnerable to challenge. 
FIGURE 1: STATE NET METERING POLICY
Source: http://ncsolarcen-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/
 uploads/2016/07/Net_Metering1.pdf. 
12. See infra Section II.A.
 13. See infra Section VI.A.
 14. STEVEN FERREY, UNLOCKING THE GLOBAL WARMING TOOLBOX 236–39 (2010).
15. See Steven Ferrey, Presidential Executive Action: Unilaterally Changing the 
World’s Critical Technology and Infrastructure, 64 DRAKE L. REV. 43, 67–76 (2016)
(discussing the Clean Power Plan promulgated through executive action, now being
challenged, and in 2016 temporarily stayed by the U.S. Supreme Court). 
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This Article charts what is missing to legally protect net metering policy 
to address climate change and global warming.  Section II dissects very
different net metering policy in forty-four states and proceeds to navigate 
across sensitive legal ‘trip wires’ which could impair these mechanisms.
Section II examines the stakeholders, the roles they play, and their benefits
from the net metering system at the core of renewable energy and climate
change policy in the United States.  This Article also focuses on the most
legally advanced state net metering system, the exodus of net metering
customers from contributing to operation of the electric grid, and the 
mounting impacts for those who remain behind.
Section III dives from regulatory policy into the subatomic level, analyzing 
how the physics of electricity in the United States align and misalign with 
the law. Electric power, alone among all forms of energy on the planet, 
is the only one that cannot be stored:  Supply of power must instantaneously 
second-by-second exactly match the demand for power or the power grid 
collapses as it did in the Eastern United States in 2003.16  Rapidly expanding
intermittent renewable energy sources, like solar power and wind power,
pose new legal and financial challenges to the maintenance of a reliable 
power grid.17  There are significant additional costs and environmental 
externalities which states now must confront.18 
Precedent matters.  Section IV analyzes in detail the law and precedent 
applied to American power, which require equitable and precise allocation 
of the costs of every power transaction.  Section IV analyzes often overlooked
decisions which could constrain net metering of renewable power until
states do what they have consciously omitted.  Only two states have made
this effort to date, which the Article examines.
Section V “follows the money”19 to examine who benefits and who pays
for net metering. The legal and financial issue is examined from different
stakeholder perspectives. Section V examines three different utilities and
their proposals in the most solar states, and who wins and loses in a zero-
sum power calculation.
Legal vulnerabilities require solutions.  Section VI applies the often ignored
precedent to design legally “bullet-proof” state policies to address climate
change and renewable energy.  This must be done as we teeter on the edge 
of the global warming “tipping point.” 
This Article starts by examining the “what” and “how” of net metering,
which is the major U.S. policy to address climate change and transition to 
renewable power. 
16. See infra Section III.C.
 17. See infra Section III.E. 
18. See infra Section III.E. 
19. ALL THE PRESIDENT’S MEN (Warner Brothers Pictures 1976). 
226
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II.  NETTING THE WHOLE POWER 
A. Who Nets What? 
The most used state subsidy for renewable power and for combatting 
climate change is net metering20 used in forty-four States:21 




 of the states have implemented renewable portfolio 
 33% of the states have adopted renewable System Benefit 
Charges/trust funds.22 
Net metering is a policy that allows retail electricity customers to receive
credits on their utility bills for on-site renewable energy generation exported
to the state’s electric grid in excess of their electric load.23  During times 
when energy is not being used by the customer but its renewable energy
system is producing electricity, the net meter spins in reverse direction 
registering exported electricity to the utility.24  Customers are given credit 
by the utility for every kilowatt-hour of electricity not used by the customer 
but exported to the utility.25 By turning the meter backwards, and because 
only a single rate applies to a single meter, net metering effectively 
compensates the generator at, or near, the full retail rate, which includes 
approximately 60% of the retail bill attributable to transmission, distribution,
and taxes, for transferring just the wholesale energy commodity—the power
 20. See Net Metering, DSIRE (Feb. 2016), http://ncsolarcen-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/ 
wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Net_Metering_022016.pdf [https://perma.cc/LCW7-YWQW]. 
21. STEVEN WEISSMAN & NATHANIEL JOHNSON, U.C. BERKELEY CTR. L. ENERGY &
ENV’T, THE STATEWIDE BENEFITS OF NET-METERING IN CALIFORNIA AND THE CONSEQUENCES 
OF CHANGES TO THE PROGRAM 2 (Feb. 17, 2012), https://www.law.berkeley.edu/wp­
content/uploads/2015/06/The_Statewide_Benefits_of_Net-Metering_in_CA_Weissman_ 
and_Johnson3.pdf [https://perma.cc/N52R-NQQS].
22. See Steven Ferrey, Solving the Multimillion Dollar Constitutional Puzzle 
Surrounding State “Sustainable” Energy Policy, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 121, 122 (2014)
(citing ELIZABETH DORIS ET AL., STATE OF THE STATES 2009: RENEWABLE ENERGY
DEVELOPMENT AND THE ROLE OF POLICY 65 (2009), http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy10osti/ 
46667.pdf [https://perma.cc/WE9A-39HZ]).
23. See Net Metering, NAT’L GRID (2016), https://www.nationalgridus.com/masselectric/
business/energyeff/4_net-mtr.asp. 
24. See id.
 25. See id.
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itself.26  The value received for that net metered power is an amount above
the utility’s avoided cost27 or the wholesale rate set by the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (FERC) or by independent system operators (ISOs)
who manage the utility grids for more than half of consumers.
The net metered customer enjoys a free energy banking service and 
does not compensate the utility for using the grid to effectuate this energy
banking, or for distribution investments made by the utility.  The net metering
customer uses the distribution grid twice, sending and later receiving power, 
and is never charged for either usage of the grid.  Such free services are
wholly divorced from rate making principles.  For this transfer of their 
power to the grid, net metering customers pay no transmission or distribution
charges even though they are using the distribution system.  Net metering 
is an accounting convention applied to trading power that technically does 
not include a power sale according to case decisions.28 
The utilities credit and/or pay the net metering customer for the kilowatt- 
hours at a bundled retail rate, even though the utility could buy power 
elsewhere at a dramatically cheaper wholesale rate.29  Therefore, the utility, 
and ultimately its customers who incur the pass-through of all of these 
charges, is actually paying more—often triple or quadruple the price—for 
the net-metered power than it is paying for power produced elsewhere in
the market.  For example, the Author’s current retail rate in Boston is an 
average cost of $0.21/kWh, and a net metered customer would be credited
at near this retail rate; wholesale power in the New England region, and 
in most other areas of the country, for the past five years has been selling
for approximately $0.045 or less.30 
Moreover, the utility has to accept and credit or pay for this power
whenever the distributed generation produces it, rather than when the utility
 26. See Glossary, DSIRE, http://www.dsireusa.org/support/glossary/ [https://perma.cc/ 
3H9T-223C] (last visited May 30, 2016) (“In effect, the customer uses excess generation 
to offset electricity that the customer otherwise would have to purchase at the utility’s full
retail rate.”).  As to whether electricity is a “good” or a “service” and how it should be 
treated under the law, see STEVEN FERREY, THE NEW RULES: A GUIDE TO ELECTRIC MARKET 
REGULATION 211–31 (2000).
27.  16 U.S.C. § 824a-2 (2012). 
28. Steven Ferrey, Virtual “Nets” and Law: Power Navigates the Supremacy 
Clause, 24 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 267, 273 (2012) (citing DSIRE, www.dsire.org); 
see also Glossary, supra note 26 (providing a definition of “net metering”); Net Metering, 
SOLAR ENERGY INDUSTRIES ASS’N, http://www.seia.org/policy/distributed-solar/net-metering
[https://perma.cc/59KL-6MPV] (last visited May 30, 2016). 
29. For example, the author’s retail, or net metering, rate is $0.24/kWh, although 
abundant wholesale power is available for approximately $0.05/kWh. 
30. See Real Time Maps and Charts, INDEPENDENT SYSTEM OPERATOR NEW ENGLAND, 
http://www.iso-ne.com/isoexpress/ [https://perma.cc/FG93-VH8Q] (last visited May 30, 
2016); Wholesale Electricity and Natural Gas Market Data, ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (May
26, 2016), http://www.eia.gov/electricity/wholesale/ [https://perma.cc/B9V2-7QAX].
228
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needs power to distribute to its customers.  There is no advance notice
required from the net metered customer as to when this power transfer of 
renewable energy will occur or for what duration, from intermittent power 
generation. 
Massachusetts is an order of magnitude more advanced on net metering 
compared to any of the other forty-two states which employ he practice. 
Massachusetts has “virtual net metering” that is more far-reaching than 
the other states because net metering credits can be transferred to other 
customers in the utility service territory.31 In Massachusetts, net metering 
participants are defined as producers belonging to one of three classes 
based on type, size, and ownership of the renewable energy generating
facility, and they receive different credit amounts for their net metered
power.  The distribution utilities are allowed to recapture any lost revenues
from net metering from all other retail customers.
In 2008, the Green Communities Act expanded the Massachusetts net 
metering program.32  Originally capped at a size of 60 kW per system in 
the 1980s, Massachusetts utility customers can now net meter up to 2 MW 
on any parcel of land.33  The net metering credits now earn a value close 
to the retail power rate.  Net metering customers can transfer or sell their 
net metering credits to any other customer of the utility in the same load 
zone.34 Since 2008, Massachusetts implemented a series of net metering 
cap increases35 until 4% of each utility’s overall peak electricity load is
reserved for private net metering credit off-takers and 5% is reserved for 
public net metering off-takers, for a total of 9% of peak load which is 
already fully net metered.36 
31. 220 MASS. CODE REGS. § 18.00 (2015). 
32. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 164 (West 2008). 
33. See id. at § 138. 
34. See History of Solar in Massachusetts, MASSSOLAR, http://www.solarisworking.
org/history [https://perma.cc/73VK-XMUM] (last visited May 30, 2016). 
35. See Green Communities Act?, MASS.’ BUS. FOR CLEAN ENERGY, http://www.
mabizforcleanenergy.com/ma-supports-clean-energy/green-communities-act [https://perma.
cc/C45A-DX7U] (last visited May 30, 2016).
36. See Massachusetts Net Metering, EVERSOURCE, https://www.eversource.com/
Content/nh/about/doing-business-with-us/builders-contractors/interconnections/massachusetts
-net-metering (last visited May 30, 2016). 
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The limits on net metered system size range from 10 kW in Indiana, to 
80 MW in New Mexico,37 and there is no limit in Arizona and Ohio.38  In 
California, the maximum generation capacity is 1 MW, and the credits 
generated by a consumer or group of consumers electing to net meter are 
reverted back to the utility at the end of each year if they are not used.39 
In New York, there is a 2 MW cap on generation eligible for net metering, 
but this limit only applies to non-residential solar or wind projects, and
residential solar and wind generators must stay below a 25 kW maximum.40 
So while every state is different in the detail of its program, forty-four
states have in common the most used primary tool for renewable energy
and addressing climate change in the U.S.:  Net metering. 
B. Net Exodus? 
Federal law has encouraged net metering.  The Energy Policy Act of
2005 (EPACT) encouraged the widespread adoption of net metering policies 
at the state level.41  Under EPACT, state regulatory commissions and electric
utilities were required to consider making net metering services available to
retail electricity consumers upon request.42 Forty-four states and the District
of Columbia have some form of net metering policy, while six states— 
Alabama, Idaho, Mississippi, South Dakota, Tennessee, and Texas—do
not have net metering.43 The growth has been palpable.  As of 2003, there
were approximately 7,000 net metering electricity customers out of a total 
of more than 100 million customers in the United States,44 and in 2010, the 
37. IREC and Vote Solar Release 2015 Freeing the Grid, INTERSTATE RENEWABLE
ENERGY COUNCIL (Jan. 24, 2016), http://www.irecusa.org/2016/01/irec-and-vote-solar­
release-2015-freeing-the-grid/ [https://perma.cc/Y74G-4836]; Indiana, FREEING THE GRID, 
http://www.freeingthegrid.org/#state-grades/Indiana [https://perma.cc/C52C-XPR3] (last 
visited May 30, 2016); New Mexico, FREEING THE GRID, http://freeingthegrid.org/#states­
grades/new-mexico [https://perma.cc/68HX-DL6D] (last visited May 30, 2016). 
38. Arizona, FREEING THE GRID, http://freeingthegrid.org/#state-grades/Arizona
[https://perma.cc/P6BB-8SJG] (last visited May 30, 2016); Ohio, FREEING THE GRID
(2015), http://freeingthegrid.org/#states-grades/ohio [https://perma.cc/F29V-NVC5] (last
visited May 30, 2016). 
39. California, FREEING THE GRID, http://freeingthegrid.org/#states-grades/california
[https://perma.cc/6YWM-ZT7B] (last visited June 1, 2016). 
40. New York, FREEING THE GRID, http://freeingthegrid.org/#states-grades/new-york 
[https://perma.cc/DD99-3Z3R] (last visited June 1, 2016). 
41.  16 U.S.C. § 2621(d)(11) (2012). 
42. Id.
 43. See Durkay, supra note 5.  Alabama, Idaho, Mississippi, South Dakota, Tennessee 
and Texas are the only states without a state net metering program.  Id.
 44. Participation in Electric Net-Metering Programs Increased Sharply in Recent 
Years, Today in Energy, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (May 15, 2012), http://www.eia.gov/
todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=6270 [https://perma.cc/NV4F-EDZS].
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number had increased twenty-fold to 150,000.45  Notwithstanding this expansion, 
net metering customers still comprise a small fraction of less than one 
percent of all energy consumers.46 
The relationship of both the 1% and the other 99% are important as we 
make this evolution.  Do net metering customers exit the grid and become 
self-generating islands unto themselves?  No. They typically only generate
some of their energy requirements, and still rely on the grid for a significant
portion and timing of their power, which can still be the majority of their 
energy requirements.47  However, the economics are evolving:  In the future, 
it could become cost-effective to self-generate with solar PV power.  Grid 
exodus could become a viable option for residential system owners in 
Hawaii before 2020, in California in the early 2020s, and in New York
State in the late 2020s. More southern latitudes could begin to achieve 
attractive internal rates of return from self-generation around 2020.48 
But until then, net metering customers depend on the grid in the same 
critical manner as do conventional customers, and do so in a bilateral
direction.49  When the customer demands more electricity than their generator 
produces—for example, on a cloudy, humid, summer day when the air 
conditioner is running but the sun is not shining—the meter runs forward.50 
When the customer generates more electricity than they demand, the meter 
runs backwards.51  It is still very much a bidirectional transaction on a
real-time basis. 
45. Id.
46. Id.  As of 2010, net metering customers represented only 0.1% of all energy
customers in the United States. Id.
 47. See Net Metering 101, INST. FOR ENERGY RESEARCH (Jan. 14, 2014), http://www. 
instituteforenergyresearch.org/analysis/net-metering-101 [https://perma.cc/5SN6-LVTB].
48. William Rickerson, et al., Residential Prosumers – Drivers and Policy Options 
(Re-Prosumers), INT’L ENERGY AGENCY 18 (Sept. 2014), http://iea-retd.org/wp-content/ 
uploads/2014/09/RE-PROSUMERS_IEA-RETD_2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/2NC9-5VFG]
(citing Patrick Hummel, et. al., The Unsubsidised Solar Revolution, UBS INV. RESEARCH 
3 (Jan. 15, 2013), http://www.qualenergia.it/sites/default/files/articolo-doc/UBS.pdf [https://
perma.cc/5JJ8-Y5DL]). 
49. Ferrey, supra note 28, at 273. 
50. Id.
 51. Id. 
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A. The Intangibility of Power 
Electric power has a delivered value in the U.S. of approximately $390
billion annually,52 exceeding the total amount of corporate income taxes 
collected in the U.S.53 
The high-voltage transmission network was recognized by engineers as 
the most important engineering feat of the 20 century.54  In terms of  
physical assets, the “grid” is composed not only of the approximately
4,800 interconnected power generation resources in the United States, but
also of the cable to connect them with consumers, and the hardware to
manage them in an energized instantaneous network.55  The high-voltage
transmission network at 230 kV and higher, comprises 167,000 miles of 
line in America.56  In the United States there is an eastern interconnection, 
a western interconnection, and a separate interconnection that includes
most of Texas.57  The transmission system operates at fifteen different 
voltage levels,58 with limited power transactions between these three
major interconnections. 
The electromagnetic force that is electricity is one of the four known 
primary forces in the universe.  The so-called weak force and the 
52. See Electric Power Annual Table 2.3 in U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ELECTRIC 
POWER ANNUAL 2014 (Feb. 16, 2016), http://eia.gov/electricity/annual/pdf/epa.pdf
[https://perma.cc/E4Z8-CHXU].  The average delivered price of all electricity nationwide
in 2011 was $0.0966/kWh, and $0.1109/kWh for residential customers.  See Average 
Retail Price of Electricity to Ultimate Customers by End-Use Sector, by State, Year-to-
Date through February 2011 and 2010, PUB. POL’Y INST. OF N.Y. STATE, INC., 
http://ppinys.org/reports/jtf/2011/employ/average-retail-price-of-electricity2010-11.htm 
[https://perma.cc/9LLS-L3G2] (last visited June 1, 2016). 
53. Historical Amount of Revenue by Source, TAX POL’Y CTR. (Feb. 4, 2015), 
http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxfacts/displayafact.cfm?Docid=203 [https://perma.cc/CBL6­
GL2A].
54. Mason Willrich, Electricity Transmission Policy for America: Enabling a
Smart Grid, End to End 5 (MIT-IPC-Energy Innovation Working Paper 09-003), 
https://ipc.mit.edu/sites/default/files/documents/EIP_09-003.pdf https://perma.cc/GZ2G­
DW9J].
55. Energy Glossary, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., http://www.eia.gov/tools/glossary/
index.cfm?id=e#electr_pow_grid [https://perma.cc/6BSM-TDVA] (last visited June 1, 
2016) (defining electric power grid). 
56. STAN MARK KAPLAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40511, ELECTRIC POWER 
TRANSMISSION: BACKGROUND AND POLICY ISSUES 1–5 & n.3 (Apr. 14, 2009), http://fpc. 
state.gov/documents/organization/122949.pdf [https://perma.cc/GCN2-H646] (discussing
miles of transmission lines).
57. Id. at 3 & fig.2 (providing visual display of interconnections). 
58. Craig Cano, Efficiency Should Be Viewed as Key Part of Entire Delivery 
System, Wellinghoff Says, ELECTRIC UTIL. WK., Dec. 13, 2010, at 18–19. 
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electromagnetic force are united in quantum field theory, and both are 
associated with ripples in the fabric of space-time.59  Electric circuits are 
the physical means for conveying energy in a force field to different
places, but always within the line or attachments to it .60  Current is the
rate of flow of electric charge from one place to another.61  As the charged 
particles move within a circuit, electrical potential energy is transferred 
from a source to a device in which that energy is stored or converted into 
another form or work.62 
Electricity is identical in every state at every moment:  An energy field
transmitted as alternating current at 60 Hz/cycles per second.63  What is
delivered and sold is electric potential, an electric field.  While its voltage
is transformed on different lines, its critical status and movement are
constant in every state, in every transaction, and at every moment. 
Reliable electricity supply requires a constant, second-by-second 
simultaneous balancing of power generation supply to meet demand on
the utility grid.64  The U.S. electric grid will collapse within approximately 
four seconds if sufficient generation of power is not constantly supplied
to meet fluctuating consumer demand.65  Either too much or too little 
power causes system instability, and a loss of power would disrupt
 59. BRIAN GREENE, THE ELEGANT UNIVERSE: SUPERSTRINGS, HIDDEN DIMENSIONS,
AND THE QUEST FOR THE ULTIMATE THEORY 197 (1999).
60. HUGH D. YOUNG & ROGER A. FREEDMAN, UNIVERSITY PHYSICS 799 (9th ed. 1996).
61. Id.  We measure electricity as energy transferred per unit time. The usual unit
of energy is the kilowatt hour (kWh), which is a kilowatt for an hour.  One kilowatt is 
1,000 watts per second.  A watt is a joule per second. So a kilowatt hour is 3,600,000 
joules. One kWh is 1,000 watts for an hour. 
62. Id.  When a conductor, such as copper or aluminum wire, is not energized by a 
generator and is at rest, negatively charged electrons in the copper atoms are free to move 
randomly in all directions thermally in the conductor, in close orbit around their nuclei, 
similar to molecules in a gas moving in random motion.  Because the motion of the 
electrons is random, there is not a net flow of charge in any direction inside the copper 
wire. When an electric field is applied to the copper wire by a power generation facility;
the circuit is energized with controlled moving charges becoming current in a wire.  Id. at 
800. 
63. See World Electricity Standards, EMR LABS, LLC, http://www.quantumbalancing.
com/worldelectricity/electricityif.htm [https://perma.cc/Z5FC-VW6A] (last visited June
1, 2016).  The electricity in the world is transmitted via alternating current, where the 
current changes direction of flow either fifty or sixty times per second. Id.
64. See Andrew Howe, Demanding Times, ELECTRIC UTIL. WK., Sept. 19, 2008, at
20 (discussing challenges of balancing supply and demand within energy grid).
65. See STEVEN FERREY, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: EXAMPLES & EXPLANATIONS 568 
(6th ed. 2013). 
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communication, transportation, heating and water supplies, hospitals, and
emergency rooms.66 
According to Kirchoff’s Law,67 power moves almost at the speed of 
light on an energized grid.68  If power supply does not constantly balance 
instantaneous demand, the grid can blackout large areas,69 as happened to 
the northeast U.S. population on August 14, 2003,70 and subsequently
with rolling blackouts in Texas.71  The 2003 blackout affected fifty million
people and caused a loss of six billion dollars.72  During this blackout,
production was lost at approximately half of the Chrysler plants, a Ford 
plant was lost for a week of repairs, oil refineries shut down, one chain of 
237 drugstores in New York City was forced to close, major urban airports 
closed causing more than one thousand flights to be cancelled, and frozen
and perishable foods were lost.73 
Electricity is different than everything else in commerce because it is
not a traditional commodity, but a moving electromagnetic field.  Differences
matter in law and economics:  If we cannot store electricity, we invent 
legal fictions as part of a model which suggests that electricity is more
matter than its reality as intangible energy.  Moreover, if renewable distributed 
66. Michael Bruch, Michael Kuhn & Gerhard Schmid, Power Blackout Risks: Risk 
Management Options, Emerging Risk Initiative – Position Paper, CRO FORUM § 4, at 12 
(Nov. 2011) [hereinafter Bruch, Kuhn & Schmid], https://www.allianz.com/v_1339677769000/ 
media/responsibility/documents/position_paper_power_blackout_risks.pdf.  Id. § 4.1. 
67. This law is also called Kirchhoff’s first law, Kirchhoff’s point rule, Kirchhoff’s 
junction rule, and Kirchhoff’s first rule.  The principle of conservation of electric charge 
is that at any point in an electrical circuit where charge density is not changing in time, the 
sum of currents flowing towards that point is equal to the sum of currents flowing away
from that point. See 2 STEVEN FERREY, 2 LAW OF INDEPENDENT POWER § 10:98 (37th ed. 
2015).
68. See Steven Ferrey, Inverting Choice of Law in the Wired Universe: 
Thermodynamics, Mass and Energy, 45 WM & MARY L. REV. 1839, 1911 n.406 (2004). 
69.  Brownouts are a drop in voltage delivered over the transmission system; blackouts
are a complete loss of electricity supply.  Bruch, Kuhn & Schmid, supra note 66, § 2, at 4. 
70. Matthew L. Wald, Richard Pérez-Peña & Neela Banerjee, The Blackout: What 
Went Wrong; Experts Asking Why Problems Spread So Far, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 2003, 
at A1, http://www.nytimes.com/2003/08/16/nyregion/the-blackout-what-went-wrong-experts­
asking-why-problems-spread-so-far.html (examining cause of the 2003 electricity blackout across 
northeastern United States).
71. On February 26, 2008, the Electric Reliability Council of Texas grid operator, 
which has significant wind power deployment, was unable to compensate with sufficient 
backup power resources when there was an unexpected drop in wind power production by
more than 80 percent.  Rebecca Smith, Texas to Probe Rolling Blackouts: State Wants to
Determine if Generators Gamed Prices as Power Failed in Storm, WALL STREET J. (Feb. 
7, 2011, 12:01 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014240527487039895045761284 
93806692106; Richard Cohen & Gerry Khermouch, How Renewables Can Be Undermined by
Intermittency, ELEC. J. 5, 6 (June 2008). 
72.  Bruch, Kuhn & Schmid, supra note 66, § 3.2.1, at 8. 
73. Id. § 4.2, at 17. 
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generation (DG) power is intermittent, the electricity grid must compensate 
at a cost for less reliable variable DG impact on the system.
B. Intermittency of Renewable DG Power in a Volatile World 
New intermittent wind and solar renewable resources cannot supply
reliable base load power, as they demonstrate a relatively low availability
factor in the 10–40% range of total hours during a week or month.74  The
recorded annual wind capacity factor in 2014 was 33.9%, while the median 
wind capacity factor over the past decade was 31%.75  On average in Europe, 
solar photovoltaic (PV) power can generate roughly 11% of the power of 
its nameplate capacity.76  This means that a PV unit produces only 11% of 
the potential energy generation it would produce at noon on a sunny day.
With power, the transmission and distribution system is critical.
Accommodations have been made for renewable DG:  Prior to FERC 
Order 764, hourly scheduling of resources for transmission service was 
the norm; Order 764 requires that every transmission customer be given 
the ability to adjust its schedule at fifteen-minute intervals to reflect changing 
conditions of intermittent renewable energy generation.77 To integrate large 
amounts of variable generation into the power system, techniques which
 74. See FERREY, LAW OF INDEPENDENT POWER, supra note 67, § 2:11 (noting inability
of intermittent sources to serve as base-load resource).
75. Planning Engineer & Rud Istvan, True Costs of Wind Electricity, CLIMATE ETC. 
(May 12, 2015), https://judithcurry.com/2015/05/12/true-costs-of-wind-electricity/ [https://perma. 
cc/P3DF-688E]; Chriss W. Street, PUC’s Computer Tool Exposes Renewable Energy
Bloated Costs, BREITBART (May 31, 2015), http://www.breitbart.com/California/2015/05/31/ 
pucs-computer-tool-exposes-renewable-energy-bloated-costs/ [https://perma.cc/FSX6-LN44]. 
76. Ed Hoskins, Charting the Costs and Effectiveness of Renewable Energy in 
Europe, WORD PRESS (Jan. 22, 2015), https://edmhdotme.wordpress.com/2015/01/22/ 
charting-the-effectiveness-of-renewable-energy-in-europe/ [https://perma.cc/5U83-PJNA];
P. Gosselin, Analysis Shows Wind and Solar Power in Europe Is On Average 16 Times 
More Expensive Than Gas-Fired Power!, NO TRICKS ZONE (Feb. 8, 2015), http:// 
notrickszone.com/2015/02/08/analysis-shows-wind-and-solar-power-in-europe-is-on­
average-16-times-more-expensive-than-gas-fired-power [https://perma.cc/E7GE-BL52]. 
77. Integration of Variable Energy Resources, Order No. 764, 139 FERC ¶ 61,246, 
at 2 (June 22, 2012). 
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would facilitate such integration78 include faster generator dispatch and
scheduling79 and larger load balancing areas.80 
As scheduling is altered to accommodate renewable DG, the question 
remains how much system voltage fluctuation can be accommodated for
intermittent renewable power.  The U.S. Department of Energy calculated 
that approximately 20% wind power can be accommodated on the grid— 
about the amount of back-up reserve margin in regional power systems— 
without requiring additional storage or other mechanisms to accommodate
intermittency.81  With grid management, it is projected that a system could 
handle up to 30% renewables penetration.82 
C. Inability to Store Power 
Unlike all other forms of energy, the moving electrons cannot be 
efficiently stored as electricity for more than a second before, with nowhere 
to go, they are converted to and lost as waste heat.83  Therefore, the supply 
of electricity must match the demand for electricity over the centralized
utility grid on an instantaneous, constant, real-time, and ongoing basis, or 
else the electric system shuts down or expensive equipment is damaged.84 
78. M. Milligan & B. Kirby, Impact of Balancing Area Size, Obligation Sharing, 
and Ramping Capability on Wind Integration 39 (Nat’l Renewable Energy Lab.,
Conference Paper 2007), http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy07osti/41809.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
HV8Z-QEXW].
79. Sub-hourly scheduling will greatly reduce variable energy resources (VER)
integration costs.  Faster—sub-hourly—power system dispatch and scheduling would allow 
system operators to more quickly and efficiently respond to power system output variations. 
The Avista wind integration study similarly found wind integration costs would be reduced 
by forty to sixty percent by moving from hourly to sub-hourly dispatch intervals.  Final 
Report Avista Corporation Wind Integration Study, ENERNEX CORP. 48 (Mar. 2007), 
http://www.uwig.org/AvistaWindIntegrationStudy.pdf [https://perma.cc/4FC3-UUNC].
80. Greater cooperation or even consolidation among the roughly 125 existing
balancing areas.  Variable energy integration costs are greatly reduced if wind resources
are geographically diverse as opposed to being concentrated in a small area. Developing 
regional load following and ancillary services markets would also alleviate an individual 
balancing area’s burden to provide all ancillary services from its own resources.
81. Jennifer DeCesaro, et al., Wind Energy and Power System Operations: A 
Review of Wind Integration Studies to Date, 22 ELEC. J. 34, 42 (Dec. 2009).  Wind, being 
at off-peak times in many locations, will tend to displace typical coal base-load power, 
while solar PV units will tend to displace typical on-peak gas-fired peaking generation
units. Id.
 82. See PJM Renewable Integration Study Executive Summary Report, GEN. ELECT.
INT’L 6–7 (Mar. 31, 2014), http://www.pjm.com/~/media/committees-groups/subcommittees/irs/ 
postings/pris-executive-summary.ashx [https://perma.cc/D586-BEQB].
83. FERREY, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, supra note 65, at 568. 
84. Bruch, Kuhn & Schmid, supra note 66, § 3.1.2, at 6; see FERREY, ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW, supra note 65, at 568. 
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Either too much or too little power causes system instability on a real-time,
second-by-second basis.85 
We have mobilized some second-best alternatives to manage these 
imbalances.  We can convert electricity either into chemical energy stored
in batteries, physical energy potential stored as compressed air, stored weight
in greater elevated reservoir capacity in hydroelectric pumped storage
facilities, active physical energy stored in flywheel revolution, or thermal
energy as heat storage.86  Pumped storage of water is the only significant 
storage deployed for the past half-century; however, it cannot fill the entire
need and the contribution of other storage is minimal.87 
Battery storage has emerged as the key storage link for more deployment 
of intermittent sources of renewable energy. Lithium-ion and lead-acid
batteries could change electric technology in the near future by providing
economic storage of intermittent power, although the storage costs are still 
high.88  The performance of lithium-ion batteries degrades over time, in 
correlation with the frequency and depth of cycling to a degree not yet 
tested, which they will do on a daily basis assisting DG.  The bankruptcies 
of American battery makers such as A123 Systems and Ener1 have caused
uncertainty on economic battery development over the past years.89 
85.  Bruch, Kuhn & Schmid, supra note 66, § 3.1.2, at 6. 
86. Id. at § 2; U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, GRID ENERGY STORAGE 11 (Dec. 2013), 
http://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2014/09/f18/Grid%20Energy%20Storage%20Dec
ember%202013.pdf [https://perma.cc/8C6T-6QQF].
87. See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Grid_energy_storage#Batteries [https://perma.cc/
PN58-H4Z8] (surveying the forms of energy storage of electricity).  Total world battery,
compressed air, flywheel, and thermal storage capacity still amounts to only about 1.2
GWh. GRID ENERGY STORAGE, supra note 86, at 11. 
88. Rickerson, supra note 48, at 33 (“Prices for lithium-ion batteries are projected 
to fall from $700/kWh in 2013 to $300/kWh in 2020–2025.”) (citing Peter Bronski et. al.,
The Economics of Grid Defection: When and Where Distributed Solar Generation Plus 
Storage Competes with Traditional Utility Service, ROCKY MOUNTAIN INST. 24 fig.19 (2014)).
89. See Bill Vlasic & Matthew L. Wald, Maker of Batteries Files for Bankruptcy, 
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 16, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/17/business/battery­
maker-a123-systems-files-for-bankruptcy.html?_r=0; Phil Milford & Dawn McCarty,
Ener1, Parent of U.S. Subsidized Battery Unit, Seeks Bankruptcy, BLOOMBERG TECH. (Jan. 
26, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-01-26/ener1-electric-car­
battery-maker-seeks-chapter-11-bankruptcy-protection [https://perma.cc/5Q9F-FANW];
Michael Bathon, Wanxiang Wins U.S. Approval to Buy Battery Maker A213, BLOOMBERG 
TECH. (Jan. 29, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-01-29/wanxiang­
wins-cfius-approval-to-buy-bankrupt-battery-maker-a123 [https://perma.cc/DZZ9-QDHG]. 
A123, for instance, ended up in Chinese hands when Wanxiang Group bought the battery
maker at a bankruptcy auction.  Todd Woody, California Launches First “Battery University” 
to Push Energy Storage Technology, QUARTZ (Apr. 22, 2013), http://qz.com/77045/
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There was a supposed battery breakthrough in May 2015 when Tesla 
Motors announced the availability of a new advanced battery for purposes 
of solar storage for rooftop solar PV systems.  However, subsequent
observers assessed the technology, and despite its overwhelming initial
popularity, they found it both ill-adapted and uneconomical because it 
could not handle regular charging.90  It can supply only two kilowatts of
continuous power, which is less than a home requires.91  To obtain sixteen 
kilowatts of continuous power, one could purchase eight stacked Tesla
batteries at a cost of $45,000, or one could purchase a $3,700 Generac 
generator from Home Depot to get the same amount of power.92  Critics 
state that the new Solar City Powerwall battery offered for distributed 
solar backup does not improve the economics of solar, and solar does not 
improve the economics of the battery, compared to net metering rates 
available in the vast majority of states.93  Bill Gates recently stated:
“There’s no battery technology that’s even close to allowing us to take all
of our energy from renewables . . . [it’s necessary] to deal not only with 
the 24-hour cycle but also with long periods of time where it’s cloudy and 
you don’t have sun or you don’t have wind.”94 
Net metering, a regulatory mechanism, substitutes virtual imaginary
storage for real energy storage.  With net metering, one doesn’t need individual
storage capacity:  The utility provides the equivalent of free personal storage 
for distributed generators, with costs passed on not to the beneficiary
generator of the storage, but to the 99% of non-net metering customers.95 
However, the electricity itself is not actually stored; electricity is either
instantaneously sold to others with the utility as the intermediary, or lost 
the moment it is not used. 
california-launches-first-battery-university-to-push-energy-storage-technology [https://perma.cc/
6XXT-6MR5]. California is trying to take the lead in battery research at a time when 
China is also working hard on it. Id. 
90. Tom Randall, Tesla’s New Battery Doesn’t Work That Well With Solar, 




 93. Steve Huntoon, That Old Musk Magic: Is Musk’s Battery Better Than a Back-
Up Generator?, FORTNIGHTLY’S SPARK (May 20, 2015), http://spark.fortnightly.com/ 
fortnightly/old-musk-magic?page=0%2C1 [https://perma.cc/R6ER-HSKY]. 
94. Lewis Page, Gates: Renewable Energy Can’t Do the Job. Gov Should Switch 
Green Subsidies into R&D, REGISTER (June 26, 2015, 3:03 PM), http://www.theregister.co.uk/ 
2015/06/26/gates_renewable_energy_cant_do_the_job_gov_should_switch_green_subsi
dies_into_rd [https://perma.cc/XPQ9-QMUF].
95. See Ker Than, As Solar Power Grows, Dispute Flares Over U.S. Utility Bills, 
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Research at Stanford calculated that the amount of energy required to
create a large ground-mounted solar generation facility is comparable to 
the energy used to build each of five different battery technologies: 
“Using batteries to store solar power during periods of low demand would, 
therefore, be energetically favorable.”96 However, for wind farms, while
curtailing wind power reduces the energy return on investment by 10%, 
storing surplus wind-generated electricity in batteries results in even 
greater reductions on investment return, from about 20% for lithium-ion 
batteries to more than 50% for lead-acid batteries:
Ideally, the energetic cost of curtailing a resource should at least equal the amount
of energy it cost to store it . . . That’s the case for photovoltaics, but for wind farms,
the energetic cost of curtailment is much lower than for battery storage. Therefore, it
would actually be more energetically efficient to shut down a wind turbine than
to store the surplus electricity it generates.97 
Grid voltage or frequency fluctuations can cause stability issues when PV
inverters trip off when solar stops being produced, either temporarily or 
for the evening.98  Mitigation measures for this greater instability could 
include grid reinforcement, installation of on-load tap changers, advanced 
voltage control for HV transformers, installing a booster transformer, or
installing static volt ampere reactive (VAR) control.99  Advanced PV inverters 
can provide low-voltage ride-through capabilities with frequency control
or dynamic reactive support.100  So even if there is a way technically to 
accommodate this DG intermittency, it adds a new cost that so far in most
states is not being billed to those who use DG, but to all ratepayers.101
 96. Mark Shwartz, Stanford Scientists Calculate the Energy Required to Store Wind 
and Solar Power on the Grid, STAN. NEWS (Sept. 9, 2013), http://news.stanford.edu/news/
2013/september/curtail-energy-storage-090913.html [https://perma.cc/AR9B-AZHN] (explaining
that pumped hydro storage of water is used in almost all electricity grid storage, with an
energy return on investment ten times better than conventional batteries (reporting on
Charles J. Barnhart, Michael Dale, Adam R. Brandt & Sally M. Benson, The Energetic
Implications of Curtailing Versus Storing Solar- and Wind-Generated Electricity, 6
ENERGY & ENVTL. SCI. 2804 (2013), http://pubs.rsc.org/en/content/articlepdf/2013/ee/ 
c3ee41973h [https://perma.cc/F3LM-SK8H])). 
97. Id.
 98. Rickerson, supra note 48, at 54. 
99. Id. at 55–56. 
100. Id. at 58.  The current international standard for inverters is IEEE 1547, and
some states, such as Massachusetts, are pushing further ahead.  Id.
 101. Id. at 37. 
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D. The Volt of Reliability
Distribution utilities must maintain a uniform, interconnected system to
deliver electricity to customers within narrow ranges of specified voltage
levels as required by the National Electricity Reliability Council (NERC),
a voluntary technical grid maintenance organization, and state rules.102 
When PV solar or other distributed generation resources are introduced
onto the grid, this can affect the stability of line voltages depending upon 
generator rating, available solar resources, load, line conditions, and other 
factors.103  Also, at the distribution level of the utility system, PV systems
are more geographically concentrated.  Depending on concentration and
weather variability, PV system intermittency of operation could cause 
fluctuations in utility distribution system voltage that would require additional 
regulation or additional equipment to maintain the technical stability of 
the system.104 
When solar PV output on distribution lines exceeds the instantaneous
load on those lines, it can cause power back-flows between the low-voltage
and medium-voltage lines.105 There are stability issues when PV inverters 
trip off because of grid voltage or frequency fluctuations.106  In the most 
solar U.S. state, Hawaii, solar PV units in certain areas back-feed into the 
circuit and cause voltage increases and other power quality issues.107 
Since reliability matters, what equipment do we use to compensate?
E. Grid Compensation: Ramping 
There are significant externalities whenever an electric system changes. 
First, grid modifications, upgraded circuits and transformers, and expansion 
of the transmission and distribution infrastructure is necessary to accommodate
an increased percentage of renewables.108  The $7 billion Competitive
Renewal Energy Zones (CREZ) project is Texas’s most expensive
transmission subsidy to date, and its total cost falls on consumers of Electric
Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT), the Texas ISO, at a cost which the
Texas Public Utility Commission (PUC) estimates as $6 per month on the
 102. Id. at 53. 
103. Id. at 52–53. 
104. 
105. 
Rickerson, supra note 48, at 53–54. 
Id.
 106. Id. at 54. 
107. Id. at 52.  Advanced inverters can provide support to network stability. Upgrading
inverters can also help.  Germany has required that inverters on an estimated 315,000 PV 
systems be retrofitted in an effort to improve electricity system reliability and prevent
potential instability issues. Id.
108. Lincoln Davies & Kirsten Allen, Feed-In Tariffs in Turmoil, 116 W. VA. L.
REV. 937, 1002 (2014). 
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average consumer bill.109  Germany’s switch to more intermittent renewable 
generation already resulted in an additional 1 billion Euro cost, with tens of
billions more of investment required.110 
FIGURE 2: CALIFORNIA DAILY DEMAND AND RAMPING
  Source: California ISO, http://www.caliso.com/Documents/Briefing_DuckCurve_Current
  SystemConditions-ISOPresentation-July2015.pdf. 
Figure 2 shows the “duck curve” illustrating California Independent
System Operator projections of different demand in different years due to 
the additional amount of DG solar power.  A typical day’s electricity demand 
in California has historically featured two peaks in power demand—one 
in late morning and a larger one in the late afternoon. There’s a demand 
trough, or “shoulder,” period between them.  Because electricity cannot
 109. Bill Peacock, Texas’ Renewable Energy Experiment: High Costs, Poor Results,
TEX. PUB. POL’Y FOUND. 2 (Dec. 2010), http://www.texaspolicy.com/sites/default/files/
documents/2010-12-PP25-TexasRenewableEnergyExperiment-paper4-bp.pdf [https://perma.cc/
KB64-PSBC]; Matthew L. Wald, Texas Is Wired for Wind Power, and More Farms Plug 
In, N.Y. TIMES (July 23, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/24/business/energy­
environment/texas-is-wired-for-wind-power-and-more-farms-plug-in.html?_r=1. 
110.  Davies & Allen, supra note 108, at 1007 & n.419. 
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be stored,111 fleets of different power generation facilities are equipped to
follow this pattern of daily electricity demand fluctuation and to match
with adequate supply the ramp-up and ramp-down of demand in order to 
supply simultaneous power equal to coincident demand for power. 
After substantial solar PV development in California, the details of the 
daily demand curve make it look like a very different animal.  First, solar 
panels crank out power only during the midday hours when the sun is high
and the tilt of the PV panels most efficiently captures the angle of solar 
energy from the sun’s arc across the sky.  The overall demand for power
from grids’ central power plants during the shoulder period in the middle 
of the day declines substantially.  This is shown by the more-dipping belly
line of the duck curve with each additional year of solar deployment, as 
more midday solar substitutes for fossil and other generation during limited 
midday hours.  On-site behind-the-meter consumption of the power produced
slashes conventional demand.
Second, this is a fast-evolving change over just a few years’ time that 
corresponds to the increased installation of solar capacity.  In less than a 
decade, this could cut demand for central-station power almost in half, but 
only at certain sunny mid-day times.  Because of the restricted number of
hours during which a PV unit can generate power at full capacity, at U.S. 
latitudes, a solar panel can generate much less than 20% of its rated full 
capacity.  Solar PV energy production could grow so much that by 2020
the demand for grid-provided electricity would be lower at 12:00 noon
than at 12:00 midnight.112  The two peak periods form the head and tail of 
the duck curve at different ends of daylight hours; this solar dip in the
middle of the day forms the belly of the duck curve. 
Third, the deep dip in central-station grid demand during the middle of 
the day—the duck curve’s belly—has significant implications for the
costs of keeping the grid operating efficiently.  States would need more
power plants because for the vast majority of hours during the year, solar
and wind projects do not generate power, and other conventional power 
supply options or greater energy efficiency must fill this gap.
Furthermore, the curve shows that the projected growth for residential 
solar power can make only a limited contribution to serve the late afternoon
major system demand peak, but has a huge impact on greatly displacing 
traditional mid-day “shoulder” loads.113  And the slope of the late afternoon 
peak gets steeper each successive year because grids must ramp up massive
 111. See supra Section III.C.
 112. See fig.2. 
113. Planning Engineer, More Renewables? Watch Out For the Duck Curve, CLIMATE 
ETC. (Nov. 5, 2014), https://judithcurry.com/2014/11/05/more-renewables-watch-out-for­
the-duck-curve/ [https://perma.cc/A3X6-NYE4].
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amounts of additional conventional power very quickly when solar rapidly 
dies each afternoon. Steeply sloped curves of DG generation contribution
can be difficult for a system because they increase the risk of over-
generation and the need for hard ramping of fossil-fuel units in the 
afternoon—just as demand is increasing and solar is stopping.114 When
solar is a significant part of the bulk generation supply, the stress on
remaining generation units as they work to meet the steep increase from
afternoon to evening loads will be exacerbated.115  Adding a significant
intermittent DG component increases the need for spinning reserve,
increases the amount of fuel consumed to spin that reserve, and increases 
the system’s out-of-pocket fuel and other marginal costs incurred to 
maintain a reliable power system.116 
1. Traditional Fossil Units Spinning Reserve
Even at 20% wind penetration in a grid, there could be a 33–50% 
decline in the running of combined cycle fossil-fuel generation units, and 
it is unclear whether these units could run profitably at these levels, or
would exit participation in the market.117  Coal-fired units are typically 
large because coal is a less dense fossil fuel, and these units must operate
at 45–50% or more of their design capacities.118  If coal-fired power plants
are forced to cycle on and off more frequently in order to fill the
generation gaps created by intermittent generation flickering in and out of
the system, it will result in significantly higher operation and maintenance 
expenses, increased heat rate which is a proxy for inefficiency of electricity 
production, increased start-up costs, and a shorter life of the unit.119 
One analysis of coal-plant cycling against intermittent renewable power’s 
hourly variations found that environmental emissions during cycling were 
8% higher for sulfur dioxide and 10% higher for nitrogen oxides than
emissions of the same compounds during constant operation.120 See
Figure 3. Some studies estimate added carbon emissions from ramping
backup fossil-fired power to offset the carbon emission saved by wind or 
114. Id.
 115. Id.
 116. See J. Nicholas Puga, The Importance of Combined Cycle Generating Plants in 
Integrating Large Levels of Wind Power Generation, 23 ELEC. J. 33, 34 (Aug.–Sept. 2010). 
117. Id.
 118. Id. at 37. 
119. Id.
 120. Id. at 38. 
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solar energy by approximately 20%.121  Moreover, while generators “spin” to
increase their temperatures to their design values, so as to immediately fill 
each gap created by intermittent power supply, the power that these 
spinning units produce may or may not be used by the grid, thus incurring 
power “uplift” costs to the grid.122 
FIGURE 3: POWER CYCLING & RESULTANT EMISSIONS
This need for spinning reserve of traditional units would call on existing 
coal, oil, or natural gas plants to spin. While the more modern coal plants
have the ability to ramp up and down more flexibly than older units, they 
do not have the flexibility to match the ongoing real-time variability
fluctuations in wind power availability to keep the grid constantly supplied.123 
Even though natural gas combined cycle turbine facilities are better equipped 
to cycle up and down than coal plants—and can be modified to increase
their start-up times by up to 50% to accommodate pressure and temperature
transients of their steam turbines and readiness of their heat recovery steam 
generators—this flexibility still may not be able to follow the ongoing
intermittency of greater renewable power in the grid.124 
121. Warren Katzenstein & Jay Apt, Air Emissions Due to Wind and Solar Power, 
43 ENVTL. SCI. & TECH. 253–58 (2009). 
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As one redeploys existing fossil-fuel facilities to fill growing gaps
created by intermittent power, there is an efficiency and environmental
price which few state studies have recognized.125  Gas combined cycle
units will experience higher heat rates, less efficient operation, greater 
maintenance expenses, and consequent unavailability.126  Ramping fossil
generation units can increase maintenance costs and cause earlier
replacements of certain generation facility components.127  European data
illustrates that its shift from traditional coal unit operation to more operation 
of natural gas-fired combined cycle units resulted in an increase in these
units’ operation & maintenance (O&M) costs, an increase in outages, and
a decrease in availability.128 
2. New Power Units Ramping 
If the ambitious levels of renewable generation (mainly wind) established by RPS
[renewable portfolio standard] mandates are to be successfully integrated into
electricity markets, policymakers and regulators will have to make sure that fast 
up- and down-ramping generation resources are available as operating reserves
to the grid operator.129 
There is a need for installation on the grid of more quick-start spinning
reserve to respond to the constant intermittency of solar and wind generation 
and provide load-following generation.130  Building this new generation
requires a significant capital outlay, which is only used to supply sporadic 
load-following services to fill the gaps in intermittent power supply.  There
is a very large and often uncalculated cost to maintain reliability of the 
electric system, necessary if and only if, additional intermittent power is
125. Randy T. Simmons et al., The True Cost of Energy: Wind Power, INST. OF
POLITIAL ECON., UT. STATE U. 9 (July 2015), http://www.strata.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/
07/Full-Report-True-Cost-of-Wind1.pdf [https://perma.cc/K5H6-C5PL].
126. Id.
 127. Rickerson, supra note 48, at 52.
128. W. Edward Platt & Richard B. Jones, The Impact of Carbon Trading on 
Performance: What Europe’s Experience Can Teach North American Generators, POWER
(Jan. 1, 2010), http://www.powermag.com/the-impact-of-carbon-trading-on-performance­
what-europes-experience-can-teach-north-american-generators [https://perma.cc/8GMG­
HH88].
129. Puga, supra note 116, at 42; see also A. Ohler & K. Radusewicz, Indirect 
Impacts in Illinois from a Renewable Portfolio Standard, 23 ELECTRICITY J. 65, 65 (Aug.–
Sept. 2010), www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1040619010001971/pdfft?md5
=d89cb161013fae68d71f280064dcfd77&pid=1-s2.0-S1040619010001971-main.pdf. 
130. Puga, supra note 116, at 42. 
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given first-priority to supply power.131  Ramping and cycling is estimated 
to add $23/MWh to the delivered cost of wind energy. 132  With a lower 
capacity factor than wind, solar would experience a higher per megawatt-
hour ramping charge than does wind power. 
The questions that all of the studies and literature fail to address are:
Who is the cost causer, and who should be the payer for these additional
costs to alter the power system—the most capital-intensive sector of the
U.S. economy?133  There are two bi-polar options for this cost allocation: 
 Allocate the cost of new quick-start ramping generation
and power storage to the owners of intermittent power 
generation whose entrance to the market necessitates these
investments, or 
 Allocate these costs to all consumers of power by raising 
all power rates. 
The choice to date in U.S. states is to allocate these storage, ramping, 
and back-up supply costs to all consumers, rather than to the 1% who are 
generators of intermittent power responsible for necessitating these ramping 
and storage investments.  California has ordered its utilities to build 
additional significant storage capacity each year, which is to be billed to 
all utility consumers who do not supply power themselves or require or
utilize this storage of energy.134  Germany is far more advanced than the
United States in deploying DG intermittent power: There are five times as 
many potential disruptions due to German grid instability—caused in 
significant part by more intermittent generation—as four years before,
raising the risk of blackouts.135 
131. ISO-NE and PJM ISO require that if bid at a market-clearing price or having 
“must take” status, which all  solar power does, is taken as initial supply whenever it is 
supplied to the grid without advance scheduling or bidding supply into the system.  See
Jeremy Elmer, Working With the ISO to Integrate Renewable Energy in New England, 
CONSERVATION L. FOUND. (Sept. 15, 2014) (emphasis added), http://www.clf.org/blog/clean- 
energy-climate-change/renewable-energy-in-new-england [https://perma.cc/36XZ-KCZZ]
(“Wind, like solar energy, is not a dispatchable power source; that is, it cannot be turned
on at will”).
132. Michael Giberson, Assessing Wind Power Cost Estimates, INST. FOR ENERGY
RES. 9 (Oct. 2013), http://instituteforenergyresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/ 
Giberson-study-Final.pdf. 
133. SIMMONS ET AL., supra note 125, at 9. 
134. A.B. 2514, 2009-10 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2010).  See Marc Campopiano et al., 
California Public Utilities Commission Approves Pioneering Energy Storage Mandate, 
LATHAM & WATKINS: CLEAN ENERGY L. REP. (Nov. 22, 2013), http://www.cleanenergylaw 
report.com/energy-regulatory/california-public-utilities-commission-approves-pioneering- 
energy-storage-mandate/ [https://perma.cc/DL7T-KCXE].
135.   Julia Mengewein, German Utilities Bail Out Electric Grid at Wind’s Mercy, 
BLOOMBERG (July 30, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-07-24/german­
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IV. THE LEGAL VORTEX
A. The Federal Level: FERC Commerce Clause Power             

Regarding Distributed Generation 

1. FERC Jurisdiction 

FERC has pressed for more competition in energy supply and transmission 
over a two-decade period. In Order No. 888,136 the Commission established 
the foundation for non-discriminatory open access transmission service 
by electric utilities.  All regulated public utilities that own, control, or 
operate jurisdictional transmission facilities are required by FERC Order 
888 to have open access transmission tariffs (OATTs) that must track the 
FERC-mandated pro forma open access transmission tariff.137  The pro  
forma tariff requires that the transmission provider plan and construct 
additional transmission facilities to serve network customers “on a basis 
comparable to the Transmission Provider’s delivery of its own generating 
and purchased resources to its Native Load Customers.”138  FERC promulgated
a revised pro forma OATT in Order 888-A, providing an incumbent customer 
with a right of first refusal (ROFR) to match the duration offered by a new 
utilities-bail-out-electric-grid-at-wind-s-mercy.  One grid operator required balancing adjusts 
of generation 1,009 times in 2013 to stabilize the grid,  and 209 times in 2010.  Id.  In 
Germany’s balancing market auctions, winning bidders have been paid as much as 13,922
euros ($18,700) to pledge set aside one megawatt for balancing services provided on notice
of 15 minutes, 5 minutes, or 30 seconds. Id.
 136. Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-Discriminatory
Transmission Services by Public Utilities; Recovery of Stranded Costs by Public Utilities
and Transmitting Utilities, Order No. 888, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,036, 61 Fed. Reg.
21,540 (May 10, 1996), clarified, 76 FERC ¶ 61,009 (1996) and 76 FERC ¶ 61,347 (1996), 
reh’g, Order No. 888-A, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,048, 62 Fed. Reg. 12,274 (Mar. 14, 
1997), clarified, 79 FERC ¶ 61,182 (1997), reh’g, Order No. 888-B, 81 FERC ¶ 61,248, 
62 Fed. Reg. 64,688 (Dec. 9, 1997), reh’g, Order No. 888-C, 82 FERC ¶ 61,046 (1998), 
aff’d, Transmission Access Pol’y Study Grp. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 225 
F.3d 667 (D.C. Cir. 2000), aff’d, New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1 (2002). 
137.  18 C.F.R. § 35.28(a), (c) (2011). 
138. Preventing Undue Discrimination and Preference in Transmission Service, 72
Fed. Reg. 12,266, 12,521 (Mar. 15, 2007) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pts. 35, 37). 
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customer at a full OATT rate.139  Non-public utilities may have “reciprocity”
open access transmission tariffs.140 
In Order No. 890,141 the Commission amended the Order No. 888 pro
forma tariff to require transmission providers to plan for the needs of their 
customers on a comparable basis to planning for their own needs.142 To 
better ensure that planning and construction occur in a non-unduly 
discriminatory manner, Orders No. 890 and 890-A mandated coordinated, 
open and transparent transmission planning on a local and regional level.143 
139. Idaho Power Co. v. Fed. Energy Regulator Comm’n, 312 F.3d 454, 457 (D.C. 
Cir. 2003); see also Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-
Discriminatory Transmission Services by Public Utilities; Recovery of Stranded Costs by
Public Utilities and Transmitting Utilities, 62 Fed. Reg. 12,274, 12,274 (Mar. 14, 1997)
(to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35).  FERC ordered Idaho Power Co. to continue to supply
power to an incumbent customer at the end of its contract term even though a merchant 
customer had offered more attractive contract term.  Idaho Power Co. v. Fed. Energy
Regulatory Comm’n, 312 F.3d 454, 457–58.  The Court of Appeals reversed the FERC
Order and held that an incumbent must match a new potential customer’s superior offer.
Id. at 463–65. A right of first refusal is a right to match the terms of a third party’s highest 
offer. Id. at 456–57. 
140. 18 C.F.R. § 35.28(a), (e).  “Reciprocity” provides a so-called safe harbor, ensuring
that the non-public utility is entitled to transmission service from public entities.  Id.
141. Preventing Undue Discrimination and Preference in Transmission Service, 72
Fed. Reg. 12,266 (Mar. 15, 2007) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pts. 35 and 37), reh’g, Order 
No. 890-A, 73 Fed. Reg. 2984 (Jan. 16, 2008), reh’g, Order No. 890-B, 123 FERC ¶
61,299 (2008), reh’g, Order No. 890-C, 126 FERC ¶ 61,228 (2009). 
142. N.Y. Reg’l Interconnect, Inc. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 634 F.3d
581, 584 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Preventing Undue Discrimination and Preference in Transmission 
Service, Order No. 890, FERC Stats & Regs. ¶ 31,241 (2007). 
143. FERC explained that in light of a decline in investment relative to load growth
resulting in increased congestion and a reduced access to alternative sources of energy, as 
well as a disincentive to remedy congestion on a non-unduly discriminatory basis, reform
of the Order No. 888 and 888-A pro forma tariff was needed.  The Commission identified 
nine planning principles in Order No. 890 that must be satisfied for a transmission provider’s
planning process to be considered compliant with that order. These nine planning principles
are:
(1) 	 Coordination–the process for consulting with transmission customers and 
neighboring transmission providers; 
(2) 	 Openness–planning meetings must be open to all affected parties;
(3) 	 Transparency–access must be provided to the methodology, criteria, and
processes used to develop transmission plans; 
(4) 	 Information Exchange–the obligations of and methods for customers to 
submit data to transmission providers must be described;
(5) 	 Comparability–transmission plans must meet the specific service requests
of transmission customers and otherwise treat similarly-situated customers 
(e.g., network and retail native load) comparably in transmission system 
planning;
(6)	 Dispute Resolution–an alternative dispute resolution process to address both
procedural and substantive planning issues must be included;
(7)	 Regional Participation–there must be a process for coordinating with
interconnected systems; 
248
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In Order No. 2000,144 the Commission encouraged the development of
Regional Transmission Organizations to form “competitive wholesale electric 
[] markets,”145 which the Commission needed in order to incorporate non­
discriminatory transmission service.146  All of these orders facilitated renewable 
DG, and other types of DG, to move power to all points in the grid without
financial impediments. 
FERC Order 764 changed wholesale utility planning and administration 
to provide advantages to competitive alternatives of renewable power.
Prior to FERC Order 764, hourly scheduling of resources for transmission
service was the norm.  Wind generators had difficulty meeting hourly
schedules because of significant variation in generation output within an
hour, due to wind velocity changes.147  In Order 764, FERC allowed every 
transmission customer to adjust its schedule at fifteen-minute intervals to 
reflect changing conditions.148  FERC now treats transmission systems as 
integrated networks with widely dispersed benefits. 
In amending 18 C.F.R. Part 35 in Order No. 764,149 FERC concluded:
“Changes in the generation mix and underlying public policies influencing
investment in VER generation have accentuated the need to reform existing 
practices that unduly discriminate against VERs or otherwise impair the 
(8)	 Economic Planning Studies–study procedures must be provided for economic 
upgrades to address congestion or the integration of new resources, both
locally and regionally; and
(9)	 Cost Allocation–a process must be included for allocating costs of new
facilities that do not fit under existing rate structures, such as regional projects.
Preventing Undue Discrimination and Preference in Transmission Service, Order No. 890­
A, 121 FERC ¶ 61,297 (2007). 
144. Regional Transmission Organizations, Order No. 2000, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 
31,089 (1999), order on reh’g, Order No. 2000-A, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,092 (2000),
petitions for review dismissed, Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of Snohomish Cty., Wash. v. Fed. 
Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 272 F.3d 607 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
145.  Maine Pub. Utils. Comm’n v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 454 F.3d 278, 
280–81 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 
146. See 18 C.F.R. § 35.34(k)(7) (2006). 
147. Integration of Variable Energy Resources, 139 FERC ¶ 61,246, at para. 22
(2012). Wind generator’s plant factors on the Bonneville Power Administration system 
averaged 27.1%, but the generator, under the old standards, had to pay the peak level of
transmission required to carry the generator’s load. See Michael Dotten, New Developments 
Integrating Wind and Solar Power into the Grid Power, MARTEN LAW (Apr. 14, 2014), 
http://www.martenlaw.com/newsletter/20140415-integrating-wind-solar-power-grid#_edn11
[https://perma.cc/98BG-ULEC] (citing Integration of Variable Energy Resources, supra).
148.  Integration of Variable Energy Resources, supra note 147, at paras. 2, 21, 97. 
149. See id. at paras. 11, 24 (2012). 
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ability of public utility transmission providers and their customers to
manage costs associated with VER integration effectively.”150  FERC Order 
764 requires that interconnecting DG generators pay for any incremental 
generation required, subject to reimbursement for generators who later 
interconnect to the increased transmission capacity.151 
Judge Richard Posner, writing for the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals 
in a much-watched unanimous decision, affirmed the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission’s approval of the Midwest Independent Service 
Operator’s (MISO)152 proportionate customer utility allocation of transmission 
costs for high-voltage transmission lines to move renewable wind power 
to populated areas.153  The opinion relied on this Author’s 2013 law review
article on Constitutional energy issues for its authority on the respective 
jurisdiction of state and federal governments to regulate electricity.154 
FERC Order No. 1000 requires transmission system owners to engage 
in regional and interregional transmission planning. FERC approves all 
regional transmission organizations (RTO) and independent system operator 
(ISO) terms of service and the financial tariffs.155 FERC Order 1000 requires 
incumbent transmission providers, utilities, and the RTOs that manage 
regional multi-state transmission access to the grid to remove rights-of­
first-refusal (ROFRs) from FERC-approved transmission tariffs.156  FERC 
Order No. 1000 addressed the difference between an obligation to build 
in one’s transmission zone and a federal right of first refusal: “[W]e do
not believe that [the] obligation [to build] is necessarily dependent on the 
incumbent transmission provider having a corresponding federal right of 
150. Id. at para. 21. 
151.  Michael Dotten, supra note 147. 
152. MISO’s service area extends from the Canadian border, east to Michigan and
parts of Indiana, south to northern Missouri, and west to eastern areas of Montana. See
Ill. Commerce Comm’n v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 721 F.3d 764, 770 (7th Cir. 
2013).
153. Id.  MISO allocated the costs of the transmission projects among all of the 
utilities that draw power from the MISO grid in proportion to each utilities’ overall volume
of usage; FERC approved MISO’s rate design, which led some states to initiate court 
appeal. Id. at 772–73. 
154. Id. at 776 (citing Ferrey, Threading the Constitutional Needle, supra note 11, 
at 69, 106–07). 
155. FERREY, THE NEW RULES, supra note 26, at 49–50. 
156. Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation by Transmission Owning and
Operating Public Utilities, Order No. 1000, FERC Stats & Regs. ¶ 61,051, at paras. 7,313 
(July 21, 2011) [hereinafter Order No. 1000]. For an excellent treatment of this, please 
see Rishi Garg, What’s Best for the States: A Federally Imposed Competitive Solicitation 
Model or a Preference for the Incumbent? State Adoption of Right of First Refusal Statutes
in Response to FERC Order 1000 and the Dormant Commerce Clause (Nat’l Reg. Res.
Inst., Briefing Paper No. 13–04, 2013). 
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first refusal to prevent other entities from constructing and owning new 
transmission facilities located in that region.”157 
2. Limits on FERC Jurisdiction 
FERC lacks jurisdiction over the siting, construction, or ownership of 
transmission facilities, which are exclusively within state jurisdiction.158 
FERC case law exerts exclusive jurisdiction over the “transmission of
electric energy in interstate commerce” and over “all facilities for such
transmission or sale of electric energy.”159  The U.S. Supreme Court held
that Congress meant to draw a “bright line,” easily ascertained and not 
requiring case-by-case analysis, between state and federal jurisdiction.160 
When a transaction is subject to exclusive federal FERC jurisdiction and 
regulation, state regulation is preempted as a matter of federal law and the 
U.S. Constitution’s Supremacy Clause, according to a long-standing 
and consistent line of rulings by the U.S. Supreme Court.161 
157. Order No. 1000, supra note 156, at para. 261. 
158. Piedmont Envtl. Council v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 558 F.3d 304, 
309–10, 313 (4th Cir. 2009). 
159. 16 USC § 824(b); e.g., Pa. Power & Light Co., 23 FERC ¶ 61,006, at 61,018, 
reh’g denied, 23 FERC ¶ 61,325 (1983); S. Co. Servs., Inc., 37 FERC ¶ 61,256, at 61,652
(1986); Fla. Power & Light Co., 40 FERC ¶ 61,045, at 61,120–21, reh’g denied, 41 FERC
¶ 61,153, at 61,382 (1987); Houlton Water Co. v. Me. Pub. Serv. Co., 60 FERC ¶ 61,141, 
at 61,515 (1992); N. Ind. Pub. Serv. Co., 66 FERC ¶ 61,213, at 61,488 (1994); Conn. Light 
& Power Co., 70 FERC ¶ 61,012, at 61,030, reh’g denied, 71 FERC ¶ 61,035 (1995); Cent. 
Vt. Pub. Serv. Corp., 84 FERC ¶ 61,194, at 61,973–75 (1998); Progress Energy, Inc., 97
FERC ¶ 61,141, at 61,628 (2001); Armstrong Energy Ltd. P’ship, LLLP, 99 FERC ¶ 
61,024, at 61,104 (2002); Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 100 FERC ¶ 61,019, at para. 17 
(2002); Barton Vill., Inc. v. Citizens Utils. Co., 100 FERC ¶ 61,244, at para. 12 (2002);
Va. Elec. & Power Co., 103 FERC ¶ 61,109, at para. 6 (2003); S. Cal. Edison Co., 106 
FERC ¶ 61,183, at paras. 14, 19 (2004); Midwest Indep. Transmission Sys. Operator, Inc., 
106 FERC ¶ 61,337, at para. 14 & n.17 (2004); Entergy Servs., Inc., 120 FERC ¶ 61,020, 
at para. 28 (2007); Aquila Merch. Servs., Inc., 125 FERC ¶ 61,175, at para. 17 (2008). 
160.  Fed. Power Comm’n v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 376 U.S. 205, 215–16 (1964). 
161. New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331, 341–42 (1982).  The 
Supreme Court overturned an order of the New Hampshire Public Utilities Commission
that restrained within the state, for the financial advantage of in-state ratepayers, low-cost
hydroelectric energy produced within the state. Id. at 344.  It held this to be an 
impermissible violation of the dormant Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution, art. I,
§ 8, cl. 3, and the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 791–828 (2012): “Our cases 
consistently have held that the Commerce Clause of the Constitution . . . precludes a state
from mandating that its residents be given a preferred right of access, over out-of-state 
consumers, to natural resources located within its borders or to the products derived
therefrom.”  Id. at 338.  See also Entergy La., Inc. v. La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 539 U.S. 39, 
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FERC efforts to increase participation of demand response have encountered
recent legal impediments that provide additional advantages to distributed, 
intermittent generation.  In Order Nos. 719 and 719-A,162 FERC adopted
50 (2003); Miss. Power & Light Co. v. Miss. ex rel. Moore, 487 U.S. 354, 377 (1988); 
Nantahala Power & Light Co. v. Thornburg, 476 U.S. 953, 964 (1986); Mont.-Dakota Co. 
v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 341 U.S. 246, 251 (1951). 
162. In Order No. 719-A, at paragraphs 2–7, the Commission delineated the 
improvements adopted in Order No. 719: 
2. 	 In the area of demand response, the Commission required each RTO and 
ISO to: (1) accept bids from demand response resources in RTOs’ and 
ISOs’ markets for certain ancillary services on a basis comparable to other
resources; (2) eliminate, during a system emergency, a charge to a buyer
that takes less electric energy in the real-time market than it purchased in
the day-ahead market; (3) in certain circumstances, permit an aggregator
of retail customers (ARC) to bid demand response on behalf of retail
customers directly into the organized energy market; and (4) modify their 
market rules, as necessary, to allow the market-clearing price, during periods
of operating reserve shortage, to reach a level that rebalances supply and 
demand so as to maintain reliability while providing sufficient provisions 
for mitigating market power.
3. 	Additionally, the Commission recognized that further reforms may be
necessary to eliminate barriers to demand response in the future. To that 
end, the Commission required each RTO or ISO to assess and report on
any remaining barriers to comparable treatment of demand response
resources that are within the Commission’s jurisdiction. The Commission 
further required each RTO’s or ISO’s Independent Market Monitor to
submit a report describing its views on its RTO’s or ISO’s assessment to 
the Commission. 
4. 	With regard to long-term power contracting, the Commission required
each RTO and ISO to dedicate a portion of its web sites for market
participants to post offers to buy or sell power on a long-term basis. 
5. 	 To improve market monitoring, the Commission required each RTO and
ISO to provide its Market Monitoring Unit (MMU) with access to market
data, resources and personnel sufficient to carry out their duties, and 
required the MMU to report directly to the RTO or ISO board of directors. 
In addition, the Commission required that the MMU’s functions include: 
(1) identifying ineffective market rules and recommending proposed rules 
and tariff changes; (2) reviewing and reporting on the performance of the 
wholesale markets to the RTO or ISO, the Commission, and other interested 
entities; and (3) notifying appropriate Commission staff of instances in 
which a market participant’s or the RTO’s or ISO’s behavior may require
investigation.
6. The Commission also took the following actions with regard to MMUs:
(1) expanded the list of recipients of MMU recommendations regarding 
rule and tariff changes, and broadened the scope of behavior to be reported
to the Commission; (2) modified MMU participation in tariff administration 
and market mitigation, required each RTO and ISO to include ethics standards 
for MMU employees in its tariff, and required each RTO and ISO to consolidate
all its MMU provisions in one section of its tariff; and (3) expanded the 
dissemination of MMU market information to a broader constituency, with
reports made on a more frequent basis than in the past, and reduced the 
252
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changes in demand response and use of market pricing to elicit demand
response during periods of operating reserve shortages, long-term power 
contracting, and market monitoring.  In Order No. 745, FERC required 
ISOs to pay implementers of demand-response reductions in power demand
the same price that the ISOs pay conventional suppliers of power.163 
In a 2014 split decision, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit 
overturned FERC’s Order No. 745 rule requiring ISO and RTOs to pay
electricity consumers—on an equal basis as generators were paid—for 
“demand response” reducing electric usage during certain high-demand
periods.164  The court ruled that Order No. 745 was FERC regulation of
retail sales of electricity, exclusively within the legal authority of states.165 
In addition to exercising intruding jurisdiction, the court majority found 
that FERC failed to address arguments that the authorized demand response 
payments were excessive, at the same price paid to wholesale energy 
suppliers.166 The Supreme Court overturned this decision in 2016, upholding 
Order 745.167 
time period before energy market bid and offer data are released to
the public. 
7. 	 Finally, the Commission established an obligation for each RTO and ISO 
to establish a means for customers and other stakeholders to have a form
of direct access to the RTO or ISO board of directors, and thereby, increase
its responsiveness to customers and other stakeholders.  The Commission
stated that it will assess each RTO’s or ISO’s compliance filing using four 
responsiveness criteria: (1) inclusiveness; (2) fairness in balancing diverse 
interests; (3) representation of minority positions; and (4) ongoing
responsiveness.
Wholesale Competition in Regions with Organized Electric Markets, 128 FERC ¶ 61,059, 
at 61,333 (July 16, 2009) (citing Wholesale Competition I Regions with Organized Electric 
Markets, FERC Stats & Regs. ¶ 31,281 (2008)).
163. Demand Response Compensation in Organized Wholesale Energy Markets, 134 
FERC ¶ 61,187, at para. 2 (Mar. 15, 2011). 
164. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 753 F.3d 216, 
218 (D.C. Cir. 2014).  Plaintiffs were a group of industry trade associations including the 
American Public Power Association, Edison Electric Institute, Electric Power Supply
Association, and the National Rural Electric Cooperative Association. Id.
 165. Id. at 224. 
166. See id. at 225. 
167.  Elec. Power Supply Ass’n v. FERC, 135 S. Ct. 2049 (2016). 
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B. Federal Net Meter Orders and Rulings 
Because net metering is considered by FERC decision to be an aspect of
retail ratemaking,168 this determination is not within federal authority, but
exclusively a state decision.169 While FERC has promulgated two decades 
of generic rules and orders encouraging competitive power supply and 
transmission, it can also render matter-specific adjudicatory orders which 
have a similar effect to federal trial court rulings.  FERC has twice adjudicated 
whether state net metering programs are within state authority, or are
disguised FERC-jurisdictional wholesale sales of power.  Recall that if
not a wholesale sale of power, net metering is the banking or crediting of 
distributed generation on behalf of their individual distributed generation 
customers.170 
In 2001, FERC rejected MidAmerican Energy Company’s challenge to
Iowa’s net metering rule,171 holding that it “found no sale occurs when an
individual homeowner . . . installs generation and accounts for its dealings 
with the utility through the practice of netting.”172  No net metering credits
were transferred to other customers, and the net balance of flow of power 
was from the utility to the customer.173  The MidAmerican decision suggests,
but did not need to expressly reach on the facts presented, that a wholesale
sale occurs when the customer has transferred more power to the utility
through net metering than the customer has purchased from the utility “over 
the course of the billing period.”174 The net metering customers in
MidAmerican were not transferring power to other customers, nor were 
they making net sales to the utility over the course of the billing period.175 
In 2009, another case arose before FERC, and FERC176 reiterated that
net metering practices under state regulations can be state metering banking,
 168. See discussion of MidAmerican Energy Co., 94 FERC ¶ 61,340, at 62,262 (Mar. 
28, 2001) and Sun Edison LLC, 129 FERC ¶ 61,146 (Nov. 19, 2009), infra at Section
time interval during which the net metering process may take place.  Id. at ¶ 62,264. 
IV.B. 
169. 
170.  See supra Section II.A. 
171.  MidAmerican Energy Co., 94 FERC ¶ 61,340, at 62,261. 
172.  Id. at ¶ 62,263. 
173. 
See FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 769 (1982). 
See id.
 174. Id. (emphasis added).  In its order, FERC also held that one month is an allowable 
Previously, FERC had only permitted net metering to be measured over a one-hour
interval, though it stated that it was open to considering other time periods. Id. at ¶ 62,263. 
Since the determination as to whether federal law applies focuses on whether the customer 
has made a net sale at the end of the billing cycle, the allowable length of the billing cycle 
is crucial. See id. 
175. Id.
 176. Sun Edison LLC, 129 FERC ¶ 61,146, at 61,618–61,620.  Sun Edison constructed, 
financed, operated, and maintained solar-powered generation facilities at host sites.  Sun 
254
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and in such instances would not be wholesale power sale transactions
subject to federal jurisdiction.177  FERC held that the owner of the power
or the user of the power engaged in qualified netting of power only to the 
extent that less power was sold to the grid by the renewable generator than 
purchased from the grid.  In Sun Edison, FERC specified that the retail
customer’s net consumption of electricity from the grid is the determinative 
test: “A participant in a net metering program must be a net consumer of
electricity—but for portions of the day or portions of the billing cycle, it 
may produce more electricity than it can use itself.”178 
The 2009 SunEdison decision appears to place restrictions around net 
metering not as a wholesale sale of power where the net flow of power
goes from the utility to the customer during a billing period.  Instead,
FERC states that this net flow of power from the utility to the customer is 
part of the definition of net metering eligibility:  “A participant in a net
metering program must be a net consumer of electricity—but for portions 
of the day or portions of the billing cycle, it may produce more electricity
than it can use itself.”179  FERC articulates the foundation of avoiding
FERC jurisdiction of wholesale sales of power: 
Where there is no net sale over the billing period, the Commission has not viewed
its jurisdiction as being implicated; that is, the Commission does not assert
jurisdiction when the end-use customer that is also the owner of the generator
receives a credit against its retail power purchases from the selling utility. Only
if the end-use customer participating in the net metering program produces
more energy than it needs over the applicable billing period, and thus is
considered to have made a net sale of energy to a utility over the applicable billing 
period, has the Commission asserted jurisdiction.  If the entity making a net sale is 
a QF [Qualifying Facility] that has been exempted from section 205 of the FPA 
[Federal Power Act] by section 292.601 of our regulations, no filing under the 
FPA is necessary to permit the net sale; however, if the entity is either not a QF 
or is a QF that is not exempted from section 205 of the FPA by section 292.601 
of our regulations, a filing under the FPA is necessary . . . .180 
Edison asked FERC to confirm that subsidiaries’ sales do not constitute a wholesale sale
in interstate commerce or a transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce for 
purposes of the Federal Power Act, nor involve jurisdictional rates for purposes of the
Public Utility Holding Company Act. Id.
 177. Id. at ¶ 61,621. 
178. Id. at ¶ 61,620. Like MidAmerican, the Sun Edison order was an adjudication
and thus limited to the particular facts of the case.  FERREY, supra note 14, at 309. 
179. Id. at ¶ 61,620. 
180. Id. (footnotes omitted, emphasis added).
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decision: 
FERC restates this foundation yet a third time in its Sun Edison 
Because we have found that, where the end-use customer makes no net sale to
the local load-serving utility with which it has a net metering arrangement, the 
sale of electric energy by SunEdison to the end-use customer in such
circumstances does not constitute a sale for resale (and also would not involve 
transmission in interstate commerce), and in such circumstances the sales are not
subject to the Commission’s jurisdiction under Part II of the FPA . . . .181 
If one makes a “plain reading” interpretation of this FERC order, of particular 
note are the adverbs and conjugations: “Only if,” “because,” “if.”
C. State and Federal Rate Precedent
As addressed subsequently,182 net metering can result in a cross-subsidization 
of that current 1% of net metering customers by all customers, which is 
often unknown to the other 99%.  Or, on the other hand, it may not sufficiently
compensate distributed renewable power generations for their net metered
contributions to the utility grid.  The function of state energy regulatory 
commissions is to set rates for transactions in the retail power system.
Most states have not done this for net metering transactions.  As net metering 
moves forward and becomes a growing and almost universal phenomenon
in U.S. states, the exclusive role of state PUCs over net metering becomes
more critical.
1. Applicable Retail Precedent in State Law 
By law, utility rates are designed to recover the cost of each commodity 
and service provided.  Because transactions involving utilities qualify as 
a sale of an item, every consumer pays for what they consume.  The retail 
price of electricity is based on its reasonable cost of production through the 
rate proceeding of a state energy regulatory commission. Public utility law 
tracks the legal obligation to allocate costs and benefits of electricity
service in a manner that is “fair and equitable,” “not unduly preferential,” 
“just and reasonable,” and “non-discriminatory” among consumers.183 The 
fundamental bedrock principle of all state energy commission rate-setting
for any retail level transaction is that each group of customers pays rates 
based on the actual cost of serving that group with power.  This is a universal
 181. Id. at ¶ 61,621 (emphasis added). 
182. See infra Section V.
183. Paul Hibbard et. al., EPA’s Clean Power Plan: States’ Tools for Reducing Costs 
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rule of law within each state; Table 1 illustrates several selected state 
regulatory code requirements that establish the legal requirements for setting 
rates.184 
TABLE 1: SUMMARY OF STATE RATEMAKING PRACTICES THAT ADDRESS 

CONSUMER IMPACT EQUITY AND FAIRNESS185
 
STATE  BILL OR RECENT 
RATE CASE
DESCRIPTION
California Public Utilities Code, 
Division 1, Part 1, 
Chapter 4, 739.6
“The commission shall 
establish rates using
cost allocation
principles that fairly 
and reasonably assign 
to different  customer 
classes the costs of 
providing service to
those customer classes, 
consistent with the 
policies of affordability 
and conservation.”
Florida Florida Statute Title 
XXVII
“In fixing fair, just, and 
reasonable rates for 
each customer class, 
the commission shall, 
to the extent
practicable, consider
the cost of providing
service to the class, as 
well as the rate history, 
value of service, and 
experience of the public 
utility; the consumption
and load characteristics 
of the various classes of 
184. Id.  Appendix 4 of the report contains more detailed summaries for the states 
included in the case studies. Id. at 4–2. 
185. Id. at 30 tbl.1.
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customers; and public 
acceptance of rate 
structures.”
Illinois Illinois Statute 
220 ILCS 5/1-102
“. . .the health, welfare
and prosperity of all





and least-cost public 
utility services at prices 
which accurately reflect 
the long-term cost of 
such services and 
which arc equitable to
all citizens” and that 
“variation in costs by
customer class and time
of use is taken into
consideration in
authorizing rates for 
each class.”
Iowa State of Iowa to 
RPU-2013-0004 
(Order Issued
March 17, 2014) 
Explaining a sub-rule
related new service, 
notes the provision “. . .is 
designed to insure that 
no customer receives 
any ‘entitlement’ to
currently existing
facilities,and that all 
customers pay their 
appropriate share of the 
utility’s  cost.” 
Massachusetts Rate Case Order-
Docket 11-01
(August 1, 2011) 
“The rate structure for 
each rate class is a 
function of the cost of
serving that rate class 
and how rates are 
designed to recover the 
cost serve that rate 
class. The Department 
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has determined that the 
goals of designing 
utility rate structures 
are to achieve 
efficiency and 
simplicity as well as to
ensure continuity of 
rates, fairness between
rate classes, and 
corporate earnings
stability.”
Minnesota Minnesota Statute 
§ 216 B.03
“Every rate made, 
demanded, or received by 
any public utility, or by
any two or more public
utilities jointly, shall be 
just and reasonable. 





discriminatory, but shall 
be sufficient,equitable,
and consistent in 
application to a class of 
consumers.”
New Mexico NMSA 1978 “Every rate made, 
demanded or received 
by any public utility 
shall be just and
reasonable.”
North Carolina § 62- and § 133.8 Subs. 
h-4
“To provide just and 
reasonable rates and 
charges for public 
utility services without 
unjust discrimination,
undue preferences or 
advantages. . .”
 259
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Texas Chapter 25, Subchapter
J, § 25.234 (effective 
July 5, 1999) 




shall be sufficient, 
equitable, and 
consistent in 
application to each 
class of customers, 
and shall be based on 
cost.”
Each specific rate for consumers must be “just and reasonable.”186  A
nearly universal obligation imposed by federal and state laws on public 
utilities is the obligation to furnish service and to charge rates that will
avoid undue or unjust discrimination among customers.187  “‘Undue’ or
‘unjust’ discrimination among customers is prohibited.”188  Policy  
considerations, such as providing environmental incentives or discounting
rates to certain segments of the customer base, must play a subsidiary role
in the ultimate rate allocation among customer classes.189 These principles
are embedded in rate decisions of both FERC190 and state regulatory
commissions191 and in principles when courts review the application of 
these principles by regulatory agencies.192 
There is a requirement for rates to include both horizontal and vertical 
equity:  “The principles of horizontal equity that ‘equals should be treated
equally,’ and vertical equity that ‘unequals should be treated unequally’ . . . [is
interpreted to mean] that equal . . . cost causers for the provision of a good 
or service should pay the same . . . prices.”193  Horizontal equity among 
different customer classes, based on cost of service, is a goal: it is illegal
186.   16 U.S.C. § 824d(a). 
187. JAMES C. BONBRIGHT ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY RATES 515 (2d ed. 
1988). If an electric plant is operating near full capacity, higher charges for on-peak versus
off-peak would actually be required to avoid discrimination. Id. at 528. 
188. CHARLES F. PHILLIPS, JR., THE REGULATION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES: THEORY AND
PRACTICE 434 (3d ed. 1993). 
189. BONBRIGHT ET AL., supra note 187, at 524. 
190.   Ala. Elec. Coop. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 684 F.2d 20, 21, 27 (D.C. 
Cir. 1982). 
191. MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 460.557(3)–(4) (Lexis 2010); see also TEX. UTIL.
CODE ANN. § 36.003(a)–(c) (West 2007). 
192. Ala. Elec. Coop., 684 F.2d at 27. 
193. BONBRIGHT ET AL., supra note 187, at 568. 
260
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for a state to set rates that “grant any undue preference or advantage to 
any person or subject any person to any undue prejudice or disadvantage.”194 
The rate charged to one group should not impose a cost burden derived 
from a different pricing policy of another group.195  Additionally, a rate 
structure should avoid undue discrimination in rate relationships, avoid 
rate structures that encourage wasteful consumption, and include rates that 
fairly allocate total cost.196  A public utility regulatory commission lacks 
the power to approve the collection of unjust, unreasonable, discriminatory, 
preferential, or prejudicial rates.197  An electric power customer only needs to
show substantial vertical disparity in rates between customers of the same
class in order to raise questions of discriminatory or preferential rates.198 
When contested, the majority of legal challenges to policies of discounted 
rates have been based on the equal protection clause of the applicable state 
constitution.199 
2. Applicable Wholesale Precedent in Federal Law 
In the Energy Policy Act of 2005, Congress supplemented the measures 
that states were required to consider with a requirement that electric
utilities offer customers a “time-based rate schedule under which the rate 
charged by the electric utility varies during different time periods and 
reflects the variance, if any, in the utility’s costs of generating and purchasing
electricity at the wholesale level.”200  States are not required to implement
194.  16 U.S.C. § 824d(b)(1) (2012). 
195. BONBRIGHT ET AL., supra note 187, at 568. 
196. PHILLIPS, JR., supra note 188, at 434 (quoting BONBRIGHT ET AL., supra note 
187, at 291). 
197.  73B C.J.S. Public Utilities § 32 (2013). 
198. Pub. Serv. Co. of Ind., Inc. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 575 F.2d 1204, 
1212 (7th Cir. 1978), aff’d sub nom. City of Frankfort, Ind. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory
Comm’n, 678 F.2d 699 (7th Cir. 1982). 
199. FERREY, LAW OF INDEPENDENT POWER, supra note 67, § 10:17; see also Mountain 
States Legal Found. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 590 P.2d 495, 496–98 (Colo. 1979); In re
Cent. Me. Power Co., 26 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 388, 430 (Me. 1978); Pa. Pub. Util.
Comm’n v. Phila. Elec. Co., 91 Pub. Util. Rep. 3d (PUR) 321, 373 (Pa. 1971). 
200. Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, § 1252(a), 119 Stat. 963 
(codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 2621(d)(14) (2006)).  Congress also required electric 
utilities to “enable the electric consumer to manage energy use and cost through advanced
metering and communications technology.”  Id.  This billing method would track and pass 
on the higher costs during peak times to the consumer, who could then adjust his or her
consumption accordingly or adopt conservation practices to defer discretionary consumption 
during high-price peak times.  See Ahmad Faruqui & Sanem Sergici, Household Response
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time-based rate schedules or any of the other standards listed in the Energy
Policy Act, but merely to consider them and to determine whether their 
implementation is appropriate to further the purpose of the statute.201  The
cost of producing electricity varies greatly hour by hour.202  The current 
rate structure in most states for residential consumers is flat, meaning
these consumers pay the same for the kilowatt-hour of electricity at any 
time during the day.203 
While the retail cost to the consumer stays the same under a flat-rate 
structure, the cost to the utility to produce the power is dramatically time­
sensitive.204  Connecticut, California, Illinois, New York, and Pennsylvania 
have mandated real-time pricing.205  In California, utilities have experimented
with critical-peak pricing (CPP), which sets a new rate structure when 
market conditions meet certain thresholds,206 yielding statewide average
reductions in electricity use of 13.1% on critical days and 4.7% on noncritical
days.207 
The burden is on the applicant utility to prove that all rates are just and 
reasonable.208 Under the Federal Power Act, FERC may only allow “such
rates as will prevent consumers from being charged [with] any unnecessary 
or illegal costs.”209  Whenever FERC determines that a public utility’s
rates, charges, or service classifications are unjust, unreasonable, or unduly
discriminatory, FERC can determine and order rates that are just and 
to Dynamic Pricing of Electricity: A Survey of the Empirical Evidence 8 (Feb. 12, 2010)
(unpublished), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1134132 [https://perma.cc/
C29T-4FJ5].
201. Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, § 1252(a), (b)(i), 119 Stat. 963
(codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 2621 (2006)). 
202. See Welcome, Smart Meters. Will Smart Devices and Prices Follow?, 23 ELEC.




205. Smart Grid Issues in State Law and Regulation, GALVIN ELEC. INITIATIVE 13 (2010),
_Whitepaper_Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/63ZZ-USY2].
206. Karen Herter, Residential Implementation of Critical-Peak Pricing of Electricity, 35 
ENERGY POL’Y 2121, 2122 (2007). 
207. FARUQUI & SERGICI, supra note 200, at 18–19. The variable peak price was, on
average, $0.65 per kilowatt-hour, and the off-peak price was $0.10 per kilowatt-hour. 
Peak energy-use reductions were 16% among customers who had not participated in the 
prior pilot, and 27% among those who had.  See id. at 20.  Households that had sophisticated
end-use controls were able to cut their baseload by 41% during these critical periods; 
household consumers with varied incomes and electricity demands all responded positively to
CPP by lowering their peak demand and, in turn, their monthly bills.  Herter, supra note 
206, at 2127–28. 
208. Nantahala Power & Light Co. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 727 F.2d 
1342, 1347, 1351 (4th Cir. 1984). 
209.   NAACP v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 425 U.S. 662, 666 (1976). 
262
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reasonable.210 Regulatory scrutiny ensures only that costs passed on to 
retail rates are “necessary and prudent.”211 
Section 205 of the Federal Power Act prohibits utilities from granting 
any “undue preference or advantage to any person or . . . maintain[ing] any
unreasonable difference in rates . . . either as between localities or as between 
classes of service.”212  FERC regulations specify that it is illegal to 
discriminate in rates between customers of the same class.213  Utility rates
should accurately reflect the cost of serving each customer class rather
than the individual within that class.214  There should be horizontal equity
between different customer classes and vertical equity among customers 
of different amounts of electricity usage within the customer class.215 
FERC regulations specify that it is illegal to discriminate in rates between
customers of the same class.216 
210. 16 U.S.C. § 824e(a).  The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals directly answered the 
issue of current “usefulness” and provided further insight into what types of canceled
investments can be included in rate bases:
[T]he Commission’s decision to authorize full recovery was just and reasonable 
and consistent with Commission policy.  We are unpersuaded by Norwood’s argument
that forcing ratepayers to pay for a plant no longer producing electricity conflicts 
with the regulatory precept that ratepayers should only pay for items “used and 
useful” in providing service.  Although a utility’s rate base normally consists 
only of items presently “used and useful,” a utility may include “prudent but canceled 
investments” in its rate base as long as the Commission reasonably balances
consumers’ interest in fair rates against investors’ interest in “maintaining financial
integrity and access to capital markets.”
Town of Norwood v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 80 F.3d 526, 531 (D.C. Cir. 1996) 
(citations omitted).
211. Midwestern Gas Transmission Co., 36 F.P.C. 61, 70 (1966), aff’d sub nom.
Midwestern Gas Transmission Co. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 388 F.2d 444 (7th Cir. 1968). 
212.  16 U.S.C. § 824d(b) (2012). 
213.  Pub. Serv. Co. of Ind. v. FERC, 575 F.2d 1204, 1212 (7th Cir. 1978), aff’d sub 
nom. City of Frankfort, Ind. v. FERC, 678 F.2d 699 (7th Cir. 1982); Wis. Mich. Power
Co., 31 F.P.C. 1445, 1451 (1964) (“Section 205 [of the Power Act] does not prohibit all 
rate distinctions but only rate discrimination as between customers of same class.”); FERREY,
THE NEW RULES, supra note 26, at 26. 
214. See FERREY, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, supra note 65, at 583; see also Am. Elec. 
Power Serv. Corp., 67 FERC ¶ 61,168, at 61,487 (May 11, 1994). 
215. See FERREY, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, supra note 65, at 583; see also Am. Elec. 
Power Serv. Corp., 67 FERC  ¶ 61,490 (explaining that the “focal point of claims of undue 
discrimination has changed from discrimination in the treatment of different customers to 
discrimination in the rates and services the utility offers third parties when compared to its 
own use of the transmission system”). 
216. Pub. Serv. Co. of Ind., 575 F.2d at 1212, aff’d sub nom. City of Frankfort, 678 
F.2d 699; Wis. Mich. Power Co., 31 F.P.C. at 1451 (“Section 205 [of the Power Act] does 
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Non-cost-based cross-subsidies among similarly situated customers are 
not allowed under most state and federal utility precedent.  If state PUCs 
do not specifically determine the value of net metering transactions to the 
utility grid, net metering could improperly cross-subsidize one group of 
consumers by imposing the total program subsidy costs on other groups 
of the utility’s consumers; utilities recoup costs from required discounts
to a given class of customers through an invisible charge imposed on the 
utility bills of other classes of customers.217  The rate-making allocation is a
zero-sum game: One class’s gain is the other classes’ increased costs, dollar 
for dollar. Or alternatively, perhaps the value of net metering to the utility grid 
is more than the retail rate.  Therefore, it is critical to “follow the money,”
to determine whether the inherent subsidy for net metering should be 
larger or smaller than merely affording by default the retail rate of power 
for this wholesale banking service. This is the job of each of the forty-four 
net metering states; and forty-two of those states have yet to do that job.
V. FOLLOW THE MONEY! 
“Follow the money!”
—Deep Throat to Bob Woodward218 
A. Key Stakeholder Perspectives
1. The Host Intermittent Generator 
Self-generation of power is attractive for owners of distributed intermittent
generation precisely because:
 It provides a free “banking” service for something which is 
inherently not bankable because it has no shelf life and cannot 
exist over time.219 
 It achieves double avoidances of regulatory imposed costs:
the generator avoids all transmission, distribution, system benefit
charge, and tax costs otherwise assessed on a kWh basis in 
the retail bill for the amount of power generated.220 
not prohibit all rate distinctions but only rate discrimination as between customers of same
class.”).
217. See  FERREY, LAW OF INDEPENDENT POWER, supra note 67, § 10:17; FERREY,
THE NEW RULES, supra note 26, at 341. 
218. ALL THE PRESIDENT’S MEN, supra note 19. 
219. See supra Section III.B (discussing storage of renewable energy).
220. See Steven Ferrey, Ring-Fencing the Power Envelope of History’s Second Most 
Important Invention of All Time, 40 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 18–19
(2015). 
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	 The avoided fractions of the utility bill collectively typically
constitute almost half of the retail bill as set forth in Figure
4.
	 The generator can receive, in some states, a suite of cross-
subsidies in the form of Renewable Energy Credits,221 net 
metering credit value, system benefit charges,222 and carbon 
credits, which collectively in certain states for solar generation 
can be worth up to 1000% more than the value of power 
produced itself. 




 221. Ferrey, Threading the Constitutional Needle, supra note 11, at 84.  The typical 
national cost to the utility to purchase renewable portfolio standard (RPS) RECs, not 
higher value solar RECs, is approximately a 40% increase in cost of the value of the
wholesale power itself, not the total cost of retail bundled cost including taxes.  Author’s 
calculation assuming a trading price of $20 for a state REC.  For a utility in Massachusetts, 
the REC purchase price is currently about equal to the wholesale cost of the power itself.
With solar RECs, in some states it is averaging 400–500% over the value of the power in 
terms of the cost to utilities for solar RECs.  Author’s calculations with Massachusetts
solar RECs selling in the $220–500/SREC trading range.  The ACP penalty price to the 
utility of not complying can be over 1000% of the value of the power involved. Author’s 
calculation, comparing an ACP of $550/SREC in Massachusetts with the $50/MWh 
average price of power.
222. Ferrey, Threading the Constitutional Needle, supra note 11, at 70–71. 
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This revenue flow can be seen in California, as the three investor-owned
utilities there estimate they will have to make up $1.4 billion in lost revenues,
which net metering customers no longer pay.223  The utilities in California
also estimate that if these costs were spread evenly among the 7.6 million 
traditional customers, each customer would experience an average annual 
increase of $185 in electricity costs for the cross-subsidy.224  The average 
wholesale electricity price in California for the first half of 2013 was 
$0.0424/kWh while the retail price was 16.03 cents/kWh, but the retail 
price later rose to $0.1776/kWh.225 Therefore, when the utilities are crediting 
solar net metering customers the full retail price, they are paying almost
400 percent more for power—which must be resold to others within a few 
seconds—than they would for electricity from other sources in the
California market.226 
Even if a DG customer only uses conventional power in the evenings, 
the capacity of the transmission and distribution system must be sized to
deliver each customer’s peak demand flow of electricity, even if that is
only for a half-hour per day.  The cost of transmission and distribution is 
primarily a fixed cost, not a variable cost based on the volume or intermittency 
of usage. Where a system peak on the “duck curve” occurs in the late afternoon 
and early evening when there is little or no solar system production, solar 
makes little contribution—lessening peak transmission and distribution 
costs. Therefore, the costs for transmission and distribution services are
not that different whether a DG customer uses conventional power for a 
half-hour in the evening or twenty-four hours a day.
The California Public Utility Commission report indicated a lower cost 
associated with net energy metering of around $370 million per year, with 
other ratepayers handling the majority of this cost allocation.227  Under
these more conservative results, net metered customers are paying 81% of




 225. See Electric Power Monthly Table 6.2B in U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ELECTRIC
POWER MONTHLY WITH DATA FOR DECEMBER 2015 (Feb. 2016), http://eia.gov/electricity/ 
monthly/pdf/epm.pdf [https://perma.cc/4755-KUWZ]; Monthly Electric Utility Sales and 
Revenue Report with State Distributions, in U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ELECTRIC POWER 
MONTHLY (2016), www.eia.gov/electricity/data/eia826/xls/sales_revenue.xls. 
226. Landon Stevens, California Public Utilities Commission Report on Net Metering, 
INST. FOR ENERGY RES. (Oct. 23, 2013), http://instituteforenergyresearch.org/analysis/california-
public-utility-commission-cpuc-report/#_ftnref4 [https://perma.cc/472B-KCL6]; CAL. PUB.
UTILS. COMM’N, CALIFORNIA NET ENERGY METERING RATEPAYER IMPACTS EVALUATION
(2013) [hereinafter CPUC Report], http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/WorkArea/DownloadAsset. 
aspx?id=4292 [https://perma.cc/DV2S-GZ3D].
227. CPUC Report, supra note 226, at 6. 
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their full cost of service.228  Therefore, the utilities are losing 19% of the
cost-of-service on average from each net metering customer, causing the 
utilities to pass these losses in revenue requirements on to remaining non-
net metering customers.
2. Conventional Consumers 
The price impact of RPS-mandated renewable energy projects has been 
estimated to range between a 0.1% increase in retail rates in Maine, Maryland, 
New Jersey, and New York, to up to a 1.1% retail rate increase in
Massachusetts.229  Two different reports found the cost of subsidies to wind
to be $19/MWh, or $0.019/kWh.230  In 2004, an Administrative Law Judge
of the New York Public Service Commission concluded that this renewable 
portfolio standard would raise residential rates by 1.8%, commercial rates 
by 2%, and industrial rates by 2.4%.  It would cut statewide emissions of 
NOx by 6.8%, sulfur dioxide by 5.9%, and CO2 by 7.7%.231 
More recently, focusing on a single state, National Grid estimated the
cost of $3.95 per month per residential customer to pay for its customers’
share of the Massachusetts RPS program, expected to rise by $1/month 
per customer by 2015.232  National Grid estimated that its net metering
costs would more than double in the second half of 2013 alone, from
$0.09/month to $0.23/month, and then more than triple again by the end of
2014 to $0.93/month.233 At the end of 2014, the other major utility in
Massachusetts, Eversource, calculated the added cost to ratepayers of net 
228. Id. at 10. 
229. Ryan Wiser, et al., The Experience with Renewable Portfolio Standards in the 
United States, 20 ELEC. J., 8, 16 fig.4 (May 2007) (explaining that an impact of not more 
than approximately one percent is forecast to be the cost of this implementation).
230. LAZARD, LAZARD’S LEVELIZED COST OF ENERGY ANALYSIS – VERSION 8.0, at 3
(Sept. 2014), https://www.lazard.com/media/1777/levelized_cost_of_energy_-_version_80.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ZS7Q-5F6T]; GEORGE TAYLOR & THOMAS TANTON, AM. TRADITION
INST. CTR. FOR ENERGY STUDIES, THE HIDDEN COSTS OF WIND ELECTRICITY ES-1 (Dec. 
2012), http://www.atinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/Hidden-Cost.pdf [https://perma.cc/
G9CS-D7HU]. 
231. N.Y. ALJ Recommends Renewable Standard Reaching 25% by 2013, with Old 
Hydro, ELECTRIC UTIL. WK., June 7, 2004, at 7.  The ruling also envisions a trading system 
of renewable energy credits. Id.
 232. Bruce Mohl, Green Energy Raising Concerns: Mandates Account for 5.4% of 
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pursuant to state law to be as set forth in Figure 4.




tered by utilities 
FIGURE 5. COST IMPACT OF NET METERING AND OTHER SUBSIDIES
Utilities in California estimate that net metering may mean as much
as $1.4 billion a year in lost revenue that will have to be added to the bills of
non-net-metering customers.235  The California Public Utility Commission 
reported that by 2020, net metering could cost non-solar electricity customers
$370 million to $1.1 billion per year.236 Stanford University economist 
Frank Wolak calculated that the state’s renewable energy strategy could 
boost electricity rates 10% to 20%, depending on a number of factors.237 
“It is easily in the billions of dollars,” he said.238 
California utilities advocate stricter limits on the size of net metering 
units: San Diego Gas & Electric Company stated that net metering provided
an “unfair and unsustainable subsidy” of approximately $34 from each 
other customer to net metering customers.239  Utilities operate as ordered 
234. James Daly, Restructuring Roundtable: New England Electric Rates and Market 
Drivers, NE. UTILS. 7 (Nov. 21, 2014), http://www.raabassociates.org/Articles/Daly%20
Presentation%20Final%2011.21.14.pptx. 
235. Cardwell, supra note 223. 
236. Ker Than, supra note 95. 
237. Evan Halper et al., Taxpayers, Ratepayers Will Fund California Solar Plants, 
L.A. TIMES (Sept. 20, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/sep/20/local/la-me-bigsolar­
20120921 [https://perma.cc/JY3Z-NXNM].
238. Id.
 239. Lisa Weinzimer, Consumer and Solar Groups Pan SDG&E’s Planned Surcharge, 
Saying It May Be Illegal, ELECTRIC UTIL. WK., Nov. 21, 2011, at 18. 
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by state regulators to be the agents of this change, and in most states the
costs of these significant cross-subsidies are not revealed on the customers’
bills, as is the breakdown of the other detailed components of electricity
cost—the power commodity, transmission, distribution, stranded costs, 
and other items.240  The California PUC Division of Ratepayer Advocates
criticized the rapid escalation in California ratepayer costs to achieve the 
RPS mandate.241  The cost of RPS compliance exceeded the cost of the
power itself.242 
Idaho sought to lower the amount paid to net-metering facilities in the 
state, in order to avoid a significant cross-subsidization of one customer 
group by another group of participating and non-participating net-metering
customers.243  Virginia introduced legislation to allow Dominion Virginia
Power to collect a standby charge from customers with net-metered systems
larger than 10 kW.244  There have been proposals on net-metered tariff changes
in Arizona and Georgia.245 
In other countries, the feed-in tariff for renewable distributed power has 
had substantial effect.  Germany246 and Spain are particular examples.247 
The costs in Spain, which handsomely cross-subsidizes renewable energy 
generation, now pays almost 1 percent of its GDP in subsidies for renewables,
which is more than it spends on higher education.248
 240. See, e.g., NSTAR monthly bill (on file with author).
241. Geoffrey Craig, Renewable Costs of California’s Three Big Utilities Soared
Last Year, CPUC Data Shows, ELECTRIC UTIL. WK., Feb. 13, 2012, at 18. 
242. Id.
243. Idaho Power Co.’s Application for Authority To Modify Its Net Metering 
Service and to Increase the Generation Capacity Limit, Case No. IPC-E-12-27, Order No.
32767 (Idaho Pub. Util. Comm’n Mar. 25, 2013), http://www.puc.idaho.gov/fileroom/
cases/elec/IPC/IPCE1227/ordnotc/20130325NOTICE_OF_SCHEDULE_ORDER_NO_
32767.pdf [https://perma.cc/7JA8-M5HV]. 
244. Net Metering – An Overview of Virginia’s Regulatory Policy, DSIRE, http://programs.
dsireusa.org/system/program/detail/40 [https://perma.cc/HY5S-Y6YJ] (last updated Dec.
1, 2015). 
245. See Standby & Fixed Cost Charges and Net Energy Metering Debates: Current
Status, N.C. CLEAN ENERGY TECH. CTR. (Aug. 2014), http://nccleantech.ncsu.edu/wp­
content/uploads/State-Status-of-NEM-Standby-+-Fixed-Cost-Charge-Debates_V2.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Q5J5-9KNL].
246. See Melissa Eddy, German Energy Push Runs into Problems, N.Y. TIMES (Mar.
19, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/20/business/energy-environment/german­
energy-push-runs-into-problems.html. 
247.  Davies & Allen, supra note 108, at 940. 
248. See id. at 975. 
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Consumers typically are charged for electric service as a function of the
quantity of power purchased rather than based on fixed costs for a set
package or use of services. NRG Energy noted that more distributed solar 
and wind power forces utilities to spread their increasing fixed costs over 
fewer customers, therefore increasing the cost of service to remaining 
customers.249 When fixed utility grid costs are allocated to a smaller
volume of sales, costs for those consumers remaining in service increases
retail electricity costs per unit of service.250 
State utility regulators could easily determine and set the actual value 
of net metering to the utility system—few states have.  Any generation 
arrangement which provides a benefit to the utility system should fairly
compensate users so that the generator can internalize its benefits.  This is 
a fundamental principle of state utility law.251  Every state is required to 
assess the value of intermittent distributed generation and set rates for net 
metering accordingly.  Only two states have done so.  It is not the purpose 
of this Article to determine whether in each of the forty-four net metering 
states, net metering customers are compensated too little or too much;
what is clear is that setting the net metered rate at the wholesale rate avoids 
the required legal determination.
B. “Raising Arizona”252 
Arizona, the state with perhaps the most consistent access to solar
radiation, is an interesting example of how different in-state utilities and 
state regulatory commissions address distributed generation and net 
metering. Three utilities in Arizona have different policy perspectives,
and the legal accommodation among various stakeholders is still evolving. 
Arizona provides one laboratory for the energy future. 
1. APS 
In Arizona, the Arizona Corporation Commission voted to allow the 
state’s largest utility, Arizona Public Service (APS), to add an additional 
249. Andrew Engblom, NRG CEO: Distributed Generation a ‘Mortal Threat’ to
Utilities, SNL (Mar. 22, 2013, 10:21 AM), https://www.snl.com/InteractiveX/article.aspx?
CDID=A-17263021-14130&KPLT=4 [https://perma.cc/BAU7-THEQ].
250. Jeff McMahon, Steven Chu Solves Utility Companies’ Death Spiral, FORBES (Mar.
21, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/jeffmcmahon/2014/03/21/steven-chu-solves­
utility-companies-death-spiral/; see also Herman K. Trabish, California PUC President: The
Utility Death Spiral is ‘Last Year’s Hype’, GREENTECH MEDIA (Jan. 29, 2014), http:// 
www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/The-Utility-Death-Spiral-is-Last-Years-Hype-California-
PUC-President [https://perma.cc/6YDB-443W].
251. See supra Section IV.A. 
252. RAISING ARIZONA (20th Century Fox 1987). 
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fee of about $5 a month on to the bills of customers with new solar 
installations.253  This modest amount is only 10% of the $50 monthly
surcharge APS originally sought.254  APS believes that this will help relieve
some of the cost burden shifted to non-net metering customers from net 
metering customers—which APS calculates as approximately $1,000 per 
residential net metering system per year, with total annual costs shifting
to non-net metering customers of approximately $18 million.255 
APS requested to collect fees for DG system losses in bills.256  APS 
claimed that for every 7,800 DG systems installed, a permanent cost shift 
between the DG  “haves” and DG “have-nots” of approximately $126 million 
over a 20-year period is created.257  The utility also estimates that if the
current pace of installations continues through mid-2017, close to $800
million in fixed costs will be shifted to and paid by customers without
DG.258 
The utility calculates that under the current rate design, customers net 
metering DG avoid paying approximately $804 of the fixed pro rata 
system costs each year, or $67 per month, shifted to and ultimately paid 
by customers without DG.259  The Commission staff then proposed a residual
charge to net metering customers ranging from $3.08/kW to $12/kW per 
month of DG installed.260  Although the Commission found that $3/kW
per month—or $12 for a customer system of 4 kW—was a reasonable 
253. Diane Cardwell, Compromise in Arizona Defers a Solar Power Fight, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 15, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/16/business/energy-environment/
compromise-in-arizona-defers-a-solar-power-fight.html?_r=0. 
254. Id.
255. Memorandum Proposed Order from the Utilities Division at 2, In the Matter of
the Application of Ariz. Pub. Serv. Co. for Approval of Net Metering Cost Shift Sol. (Sept.
30, 2013) (No. E-01345A-13-0248), http://images.edocket.azcc.gov/docketpdf/0000148646.
pdf [https://perma.cc/JAQ5-LPJE]. 
256. Motion to Reset at 2, 10, In the Matter of the Application of Ariz. Pub. Serv. 
Co. for Approval of Net Metering Cost Shift Sol. (Apr. 2, 2015) (No. E-01345A-13-0248), 
http://www.azenergyfuture.com/getmedia/731941dd-3dbb-4510-ad9c-cf67ed5b3bda/Grid-
Access-Charge-Motion-to-Reset_Docket.pdf [https://perma.cc/JU86-AS5B].  In late 2013,
the Commission began addressing the fact that customers with DG were not paying their
fair share for the use of the grid, by ordering customers who install rooftop solar to pay
$.70 per month for each kW of their solar system. Id. at 1. 
Application of Ariz. Pub. Serv. Co. for Approval of Net Metering Cost Shift Sol. (Dec. 3,
 257. Id. at 2. 
258. Id.
 259. Id. at 3. 
260. Id. at 4 (citing Decision No. 74202 at paras. 63–72, In the Matter of the 
2013) (No. E-01345A-13-0248)). 
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amount to charge, it instead set a lower $0.70/kW adjustment—or $2.80 per
month for a 4 kW system.261 
Notwithstanding the fee, in 2014, approximately 7,800 DG systems 
were installed in APS’s service territory,262 with applications increasing 
at an increasing rate.263  The increase in installations also constitutes a 
$6.3 million cost shift to those without net metering, which over the 20­
year life of DG systems from only the DG installed in the single year of 
2014 is approximately $126 million.264  APS requested that the cost adjustment 
value be reset to $3/kW.265  APS’s solar customers also have an option to 
enroll in the Combined Advantage rate plan which affords time-of-use 
pricing with a demand charge.266 
2. TEP
Tucson Electric Power Company (“TEP”) submitted an application to 
the Arizona Corporate Commission for approval of a new net-metering
tariff for future net metering customers that provides monthly bill credits 
for any excess energy produced from an eligible net metering facility at a
“Renewable Credit Rate,”267 and approval of a partial waiver of the
 261. Id. at 4–5 (citing Decision No. 74202 at 85, In the Matter of the Application of
Ariz. Pub. Serv. Co. for Approval of Net Metering Cost Shift Sol. (Dec. 3, 2013) (No. E­
01345A-13-0248)).  See also History of Solar Issue, ARIZ. PUB. SERV., http://www.azenergy
future.com/access-charge/history-of-solar-issue [https://perma.cc/H4PA-44Q3]  (last visited 
June 2, 2016).
262.  Motion to Reset, supra note 256, at 6. 
263. Rooftop Solar Applications Up 112% in First Quarter 2015, ARIZ. PUB. SERV. 
(Apr. 10, 2015), http://www.azenergyfuture.com/blog/april-2015/rooftop-solar-applications
-up-112-in-first-quarte [https://perma.cc/GAW4-MYVR].
264.  Motion to Reset, supra note 256, at 6. 
265. APS Asks to Reset Grid Access Charge for Future Solar Customers, ARIZ. PUB.
SERV. (Apr. 2, 2015), http://www.azenergyfuture.com/blog/april-2015/aps-asks-to-reset­
grid-access-charge-for-future-so [https://perma.cc/BX62-SGXL].
266. Combined Advantage 7 PM–Noon Plan, ARIZ. PUB. SERV., http://www.aps.com/
en/residential/accountservices/serviceplans/Pages/combined-advantage.aspx [https://perma.cc/ 
XCY3-UFYB] (last visited June 2, 2016).  During the winter—November–April billing 
cycles—the on-peak kWh charge is $0.05747, the off-peak kWh is $0.04107, and the 
demand charge per kW is $9.30. Id.  During the summer—May–October billing cycles—
the on-peak kWh is $0.08867, the off-peak kWh is $0.04417, while the demand charge
per kW is $13.50. Id.  The time-of-day rate helps solar units, which generate power during
the on-peak afternoon times when demand and prices for power are highest.  Furthermore, 
customers who add solar and enroll in this rate plan are not subject to the grid access charge.
Arizona’s Energy Future, ARIZ. PUB. SERV. (June 5, 2015), http://www.solartopps.com/
aps-grid-access-charge.pdf [https://perma.cc/MD3T-MJEQ].
267. The Proposed “Renewable Credit Rate” is the rate equivalent to the most recent 
utility scale renewable energy purchased power agreement connected to the Company’s
distribution system.  The current Renewable Credit Rate would be $0.0584/kWh.  The rate 
would apply to future DG Customers that qualify for the Commission’s Net Metering 
272
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Commission’s net metering rules.268  The output from DG systems in TEP’s
service area already far exceeds the state requirement for renewable
generation.269 The utility claimed that it has suffered a substantial rise in 
unrecovered fixed costs due to lost distribution system revenues through 
net metering.270  Under the Company’s current rate design, DG Customers 
do not pay for a pro rata share of the fixed distribution system costs that
TEP incurs to serve them because a large portion of those costs are recovered 
through volumetric kWh charges.271 
TEP claimed that the average fixed cost of providing any electric services
to any residential customer was $55 per month, even if the customer 
purchased no net amount of power.272  The only fixed non-volumetric
portion of the residential customer’s bill is the $10 monthly customer 
charge, which only recovers about 18% of TEP’s fixed distribution system 
costs to serve residential customers.273  TEP, like most utilities, relies
Rules.  In the Matter of Tucson Electric Power Company, Inc. for (1) Approval of a Net 
Metering Tariff and (2) Partial Waiver of the Net Metering Rules, at 1 (Mar. 25, 2012) 
[hereinafter Application] (No. E-01933A-15-0100), https://www.tep.com/doc/renewable/ 
TEP_ACC_Application_032015.pdf [https://perma.cc/64G8-G3FY].  Most of Arizona’s 
electric utilities, including TEP, have now reduced or eliminated separate upfront
cash incentives for solar DG systems. Id. at 4. 
268. ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE. §§ R14-2-2301 et seq. (2013); see Application, supra note 
267, at 1. The utility contends that approximately 7,900 of its residential customers have 
rooftop PV systems, and that it has received 600 applications in the first two and a half 
months of 2015. Id. at 3. 
269. Application, supra note 267, at 4.  In 2015, The RES DG requirement for TEP
is approximately 138,000 MWh, and the utility projects that in 2015 total generation from 
residential and non-residential DG systems will exceed the RES DG requirement by
approximately 70% and will meet the RES DG requirement through 2017.  Id.; In the
Matter of the Application of Tucson Electric Power Company for Approval of its 2015 
Renewable Energy Standard Implementation Plan at Ex. 5 (July 1, 2014) (No. E-019331­
14-0248), http://images.edocket.azcc.gov/docketpdf/0000154472.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
J5NB-SHJB] (showing TEP’s projected 2015 DG output of 229,894 MWh). 
of Tucson Electric Power Company for the Establishment of Just and Reasonable Rates 
270. 
271. 
Application, supra note 267, at 5. 
Id.
 272. Id.
 273. Id.; see also Testimony of Craig Jones at 33, In the Matter of the Application
and Charges Designed to Realize a Reasonable Rate of Return on the Fair Value of its 
Operations Throughout the State Arizona (July 2, 2012) (No. 01933A-12-0291).  The
customer charge is traditionally set at a level sufficient to cover the monthly meter reading,
billing and bill collection costs of a customer. Id. at 29. 
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predominately on volumetric sales and its inclining block rate design to 
recover the remaining 82% of its fixed distribution system costs.274 
In 2015, because of net metered power, TEP is expected to recover 
approximately only $2.2 million, or just 40% of fixed system costs, that
were not recovered from DG customers in 2014.275  Because utilities are 
allowed to recover their operating costs, the rest of these costs are shifted
to all other customers on a volumetric basis, generally with no itemization 
of the cause of these higher rates on customer bills to identify this cost shift.
The utility contends that DG systems added since TEP’s last test year rate
order, through the end of 2014, result in approximately $7 million in
annual subsidies that will be shifted to and paid by non-DG customers.276 
TEP requested approval of a new net metering tariff where new DG 
customers would pay the currently applicable retail rate for all energy
delivered by TEP, and receive compensation for any excess energy their 
systems produce and deliver to TEP with bill credits calculated using the 
Renewable Credit Rate, with credit carry-over to future months.277 This
would change the conventional net metering protocol so that customers 
receive the same wholesale price the utility pays to large solar arrays for 
wholesale solar output, instead of credits at the much higher retail rate.
This plan would see a typical customer with rooftop solar pay an increased
fee of about $22 per month.278 
The utility argues that this is more equitable because customers who 
generate their own energy with solar panels rely on the company’s 
electrical system just as much as non-DG customers.279 A TEP residential
customer without solar panels pays an average of $117.60 per month in
electric bills, while a typical net metered solar energy customer pays $15 
per month.280 The new proposal would increase this net metered figure
from $15 per month to $37 per month, which is still less that the utility’s 
274. Application, supra note 267, at 5. 
275. Id.
 276. Id. at 5–6.  For TEP in Arizona, a portion of the lost fixed costs from net metering
care shifted to non-DG conventional customers through its Lost Fixed Cost Recovery
Mechanism (LCFR).  This system charge collects some of TEP’s fixed system costs that
go unrecovered when energy usage is reduced by Commission-mandated energy efficiency and
DG programs. Id.
277. Id. at 7.  Pre-existing DG customers prior to the alteration would continue to
receive a full retail rate offset for the energy they self-consumer from their DG systems.
Id.
 278. Tony Davis, TEP Would Slice Rooftop Solar Rate Benefits, ARIZ. DAILY STAR
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calculation of the monthly per customer share of maintaining the grid on 
an average pro rata basis.281 
3. SRP
Discretion to change rates with a co-op, as opposed to an investor-
owned utility, is self-determined.  An Arizona co-op utility named Salt 
River Project, which is not subject to the same state regulatory oversight
as are investor-owned utilities, notes that typical customers who installed 
solar had an average bill of about $170 per month before installation and,
under the old price structure, their average bill dropped to about $70 per 
month with solar.282  However, the utility’s avoided costs, largely for fuel, 
fell only about $50 per month, leaving it with a monthly net revenue loss 
of $50 per average solar customer.283  The utility’s internal analysis showed 
73% of its costs are fixed, while solar owners’ reduced variable kWh
charges are significantly lower than their contribution to maintenance of
system infrastructure, without proportionately reducing their consumption
of peak demand electricity.284 
The SRP co-op voted to increase electric rates and approved a
controversial adder charged on rooftop solar unit owners.  Customers who
filed to have new PV units after December 8, 2014, will see monthly bills 
rise about $50 from new “demand charges” based on their peak power
usage during the month.285  New customers would see a decrease in their 
bills from $170 per month to $120 per month.286  SolarCity Corporation 
sued Salt River Project alleging that its new pricing policy will “punish 
customers who choose to go solar” under a plan which imposes fees on
 281. Id.
282. Herman K. Trabish, Why SRP’s Controversial Demand Charge Unlocks a Huge 
Opportunity for Solar-Plus-Storage, UTIL. DIVE (Mar. 12, 2015), http://www.utilitydive.com/
news/why-srps-controversial-demand-charge-unlocks-a-huge-opportunity-for-solar-/372548 
[https://perma.cc/FXH2-NM57].
(Feb. 27, 2015), http://www.utilitydive.com/news/srp-board-votes-to-increase-charges­
283. Id.
 284. Id.
 285. Gavin Bade, SRP Board Vote to Increase Charges on Solar Owners, UTIL. DIVE
on-solar-owners/369377 [https://perma.cc/U3PE-W5WQ].  SRP will get its cost recovery
from a demand charge that rises with peak period usage.  Id.
 286. Id.  However, if DG customers respond to the price signal efficiently, they might 
save more than $100 per month by adopting new technology such as load controllers, smart 
thermostats, or battery technology. See Trabish, supra note 282. 
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customer self-generation.287 Solar City alleged anti-competitive behavior
in a March 2015 lawsuit in an attempt to block a base fee imposed on net 
metering customers.288 
C. Minnesota 
Minnesota legislated alternatives.289  The true wholesale value of distributed
generation for the system is real, but is not a value equal to the unrelated
retail rate. Minnesota passed legislation in 2013, which allows Investor-
Owned Utilities (IOUs) to apply to the PUC for a Value of Solar (VOS) 
tariff.290  The calculation must take into account the following values of
distributed photovoltaics: energy and delivery; generation capacity; 
transmission capacity; transmission and distribution line losses; and 
environmental value.  Notably, however, it does not in any way value the 
added financial and environmental cost to the system to operate additional 
fast-start or spinning reserves to accommodate the intermittent supply of
intermittent solar power. Studies in every state omit this critical consideration 
of back-up ramping costs to the electric system.
VI. MOVING FORWARD
A. Power Equity 
California is moving very slowly in a similar direction as Minnesota to 
assess the value of solar.  California has the most ambitious state renewable 
energy program, designed to reach 30% of all in-state power generation
by 2020.  The California net-metering program was called into question
in California by San Diego Gas and Electric (SDG&E), which claimed
that it acts as an unnecessary subsidy for on-site renewable energy
generation.291 
The California Public Utility Commission’s net metering report provided 
evidence demonstrating most homeowners who have solar systems are
 287. Justin Doom, Arizona Utility’s Fee Will Hurt Customers Who Choose Solar
Power, Solarcity Alleges, BLOOMBERG BNA ENERGY & CLIMATE REP. (Mar. 3, 2015) (The
new fees “add up to hundreds of dollars per year, and make a competitive rooftop solar
business impossible within SRP territory”).  New applications have plunged 96 percent since 
December. Id.
 288. Id.
 289. See generally DIV. ENERGY RES., MINN. DEP’T COMMERCE, MINNESOTA VALUE
OF SOLAR: METHODOLOGY (Apr. 1, 2014), http://mn.gov/commerce-stat/pdfs/vos-methodology.
pdf [https://perma.cc/V48B-GQCQ].
290. MINN. STAT. § 216B.164 (2015). 
291. See Susannah Churchill, CA Utilities Want to Replace Net Metering With . . . 
What?, VOTE SOLAR (Aug. 13, 2015), http://votesolar.org/2015/08/13/ca-utilities-want-to­
replace-net-metering-with-what [https://perma.cc/K4ZU-JHEC]. 
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high energy users with an average household income of $91,000—well 
above California’s state average of $54,000.292  The average median household 
income of net energy metering customers in California is 68 percent higher
than that of the average household in the state.293  An  analysis by the  
Center for American Progress concluded that in Arizona, California, and 
New Jersey, rooftop solar installations are overwhelmingly occurring in
middle-class neighborhoods that have median incomes from $40,000 to
$90,000.294  As with any expensive new technology, this pattern of adoption 
is not startling. 
Others are raising issues of energy equity.  Observers conclude that the
“capacity of solar DG[] imposes cross-subsidies on non-solar residential
customers, and is socially regressive because it effectively transfers wealth 
from less affluent to more affluent consumers.”295  If it does so, this is
because it shifts a larger share of fixed grid system costs discussed above296 
through non-by passable fixed charges on customers who remain on the
system for 100% of their power consumption without DG, consequently
imposing more of a burden on low-income households without DG.297 
This shift of costs also dilutes price signals for energy efficiency.298 
Every state’s legal precedent requires horizontal and vertical equity in 
the establishment of rates, which applies equally to rates for net metering
or energy banking services.  Very few state energy regulatory commissions, 
who must establish non-discriminatory cost-based rates, have applied any 
cost analysis when they establish their wholesale transaction net metering 
rates at whatever their retail rates are and let the meters turn in reverse 
direction. There are costs in using the grid to send power in any direction. 
Despite forty-four states implementing net metering as the most pervasive
DG and renewable energy subsidy in America, and net metering having 
292. CPUC Report, supra note 226, at 11. 
293. Ashley Brown & Jillian Bunyan, Valuation of Distributed Solar: A Qualitative
View, 27 ELEC. J. 27, 47 (Dec. 2014) (citing California Net Metering Draft Cost-Effectiveness 
Evaluation, CAL. PUB. UTILS. COMM’N (Sept. 26, 2013), www.ethree.com/documents/
CSI/CPUC_NEM_Draft_Report_9-26-13.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZL3N-YL9C]). 
294. Mari Hernandez, Solar Power to the People: The Rise of Rooftop Solar Among 
the Middle Class, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Oct. 21, 2013), https://www.americanprogress.org/ 
issues/green/report/2013/10/21/76013/solar-power-to-the-people-the-rise-of-rooftop-solar- 
among-the-middle-class [https://perma.cc/C9PJ-WSND]. 
295.  Brown & Bunyan, supra note 293. 
296. See supra Sections II.B and V.A.2. 
297. CPUC Report, supra note 226, at 53–57. 
298. Id.
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existed for more than two decades, only Minnesota and Maine have done 
so to date.299 
The California Commission is now venturing in this direction.300 
Arbitrarily chosen net metering at unrelated retail rates in one direction or 
the other creates a cross-subsidy, which violates a bedrock principle 
of regulation:  Costs should be allocated to the cost causer.301 The California
commission found that net-metered generation currently results in a net 
cost of between $79 million and $252 million, with the additional net costs 
subsidized by other ratepayers—those not participating in the net-metering 
program.  The commission calculated that such costs would reach between 
$370 million and $1 billion per year by 2020 under existing DG build-out 
goals. 
The commission commented that the study also indicated that net-
metering customers “appear to be paying slightly more than their full cost 
of service.”302  If this proves to be true over time, the cross-subsidy to net
metering customers should increase.  Although of note in reaching this
result, California has not assessed the system ramping costs, the consequent 
increase in environmental pollution from additional ramping, or the energy 
storage costs to those DG customers whose generation causes these costs. 
B. California Mitigation Through Rate Structure 
California utility regulators are considering overhauling how most residential 
customers pay for power by switching to rates that change based on what
time of day customers consume electricity.303  The proposed changes, which
also includes a plan to eventually start charging customers $10 per month
to cover the basic costs of service, will prove controversial.304  The three 
California utilities now employ a four-tier rate structure in which customers 
using the most electricity pay an average of $0.34/kWh, more than double
the $0.14/kWh average rate for residential consumers that consume less 
electricity.305 
Assembly Bill No. 327 modifies the utility rate structures for residential 
users, allows utilities to flatten the higher prices per kilowatt-hour that 
299. See supra Section V.C. 
300. See supra Sections V.A.1., V.A.2.; infra Section VI.B.
301.  Brown & Bunyan, supra note 293, at 32. 
302. Order Instituting Rulemaking Regarding Policies, Procedures and Rules for the 
California Solar Initiative, the Self-Generation Incentive Program and Other Distributed
Generation Issues, Decision 14-03-041, at 7 (Cal. P.U.C. Mar. 27, 2014) (No. 12-11-005). 
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heavy residential power users pay for marginal amounts of electricity, and 
allows the utilities to potentially charge flat monthly fees to all residential 
customers.  Flattening the rate structure lowers high-end final inclining 
block rate costs that could be net metered for rooftop solar residents.  The 
current system ranges from approximately $0.13–0.33/kWh at different 
tiers, with spikes in past years reaching highs of $0.50/kWh.306 
If inclining rates were flatter, some of the cross-subsidy of net metered
power would move away from distributed generation. The bill also allows 
utilities to impose flat monthly fees on utility bills to offset fixed operational
costs, at a cap of $10 per month.307  The mathematical calculation may not
be as time-consuming as the politics of change; the process is not immediate.
The California legislature directed the state’s PUC to come up with a new 
program by 2017 that ensures non-solar customers are not unfairly burdened
paying for the grid.308 
Using time-of-use rates as the default option for residential consumers 
could produce long-term savings by creating a stiff economic incentive to
shift electricity use away from times of high day-time demand.309 The
state utilities already use time-of-use rates as the default for industrial and
commercial customers.  California ratepayer advocates project time-of­
use rates would result in 2,300 MW of peak load reduction.310  Some  
scholars project that the time-of-use rates could make the state’s load 
curve more manageable, perhaps reshaping the back of the “duck curve”
in Figure 2.311 
306. Jeff St. John, AB327: The Dark Side for California Solar, GREENTECH MEDIA
(Sept. 4, 2013), http://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/ab-327-the-dark-side-for­
california-solar [https://perma.cc/4PS7-QH5X]. 
307.  Chris Meehan, Energy Bill in California Gets a Rooftop Solar-Friendly Makeover, 
SOLAR REVS. (Sept. 4, 2013), http://www.solarreviews.com/news/California-bill-gets­
rooftop-solar-friendly-090413 [https://perma.cc/V63W-9S6V]. 
308. Ker Than, supra note 95. 
309. Id.; Proposed Decision of ALJS McKinney & Halligan at 2–3, Cal. Pub. Util. 
Comm’n Decision on Residential Rate Reform For Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., S. Cal. Edison 
Co., and San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. and Transition to Time-of-Use Rates (Apr. 4, 2015)
(No. 12-06-013) [hereinafter Proposed Decision], http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PublishedDocs/
Efile/G000/M151/K305/151305677.pdf [https://perma.cc/E3EF-A387]. 
310. Opening Testimony of Office of Ratepayer Advocates On 2015 Rates and 
Beyond at 1–3 n.5, Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n (Sept. 15, 2015) (No. R.12-06-013). 
311. Ker Than, supra note 95; Press Release, Cal. Solar Energy Indus. Ass’n,
















    
 













    
  
 




The proposed California rate decision would also cut in half the number
of different rate tiers based on amount of consumption, switching to a two-
tier system with a 20% price differential.312  This proposal would keep an
incentive to conserve power, but would attempt to address the equity issue
for non-net-metering customers who now cross-subsidize low-use customers
under steeper rate differentials.313  The fixed charge was delayed, but a
minimum bill of $10 per month was instituted.314 
C. Un-Net-Metering “Flips” 
Some utilities are proposing to flip the concept of net metering.  To do 
so, the meter is the message:  The side of the meter on which solar PV
panels are placed determines whether the power is net-metered by the
customer or the generator—or alternatively is owned by the utility and sold
conventionally.  This can even include solar units placed on a customer’s 
roof, depending on where the utility meter is placed.  There is a tension here
between engineering of power and the law of power. 
Arizona Public Service in 2014 filed a plan called AZ Sun DG under which
APS would lease conventional residential consumer rooftops for mounting 
of its owned PV generation units. 315  Under a twenty-year conventional
lease, APS would pay homeowners $30 per month to be set off as a billing 
credit for use of the roof to install and own a cumulative 20 MW of PV
units on 3,000 customer homes.316  APS would incur the capital, installation, 
and maintenance costs, which on a cumulative basis for the first phase
would be approximately $57–$70 million for 3,000 homes with units of size 
4–8 kW, at a cost ranging from $19,000 to $24,350 per home, representing
a marginal cost of $3,000–$5,000/kW installed.317 
The installations would be on the utility side of the meter, as a utility-
owned generation project, with APS owning the PV panels and the power 
output.  All power would be sold to customers on the grid at regulated retail 
rates.318  From the perspective of the homeowner, the home customer would
312. Proposed Decision, supra note 309, at 101–03, 284. 
313. Id. at 109. 
314. Id. at 202; Jeff Stanfield, California PUC ALJ Proposal Would Lower Rates for 
Larger Residential Electric Consumers, GREENLINING INST. (May 4, 2015), http://greenlining. 
org/issues/2015/california-puc-alj-proposal-would-lower-rates-for-larger-residential­
electric-consumers [https://perma.cc/L6U4-LUW4]. 
315. Bruce W. Radford, Rent the Rooftop: A New Front Opens in the Solar Wars, 
PUB. UTILS. FORTNIGHTLY (Aug. 2014), http://www.fortnightly.com/fortnightly/2014/08/rent-
rooftop#sthash.kJNGCRsO.pdf [https://perma.cc/CFE2-QS4N].
316. Id.
 317. Id. 
318. Id.  (This differs from the so-called “Buy All, Sell All” business model where 
the utility buys the customer-owned output at the lower wholesale rate and sells back the
280
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receive $360 per year, or more than $4,000 over twenty years, for outlaying
no capital, which is equivalent to approximately a 50% reduction in the 
cost of electric service.
From the perspective of the utility, with a typical 5–6 kW PV array,
APS might generate 8,000 kWh of electricity per year, which would have
a retail value of approximately $4,000 per year in wholesale value and 
more than twice this in retail value.  There was vocal criticism.319  This is 
not distributed generation and there is a question about whether a utility
should not earn a return on equipment installed on the customers’ residences
and included in its rate base.  Utilities across the country have been encouraged
to expend and expense the cost of energy efficiency investments in customer
residences and businesses.  Arizona in late 2013 imposed an additional fee of
approximately $4.90 per month on solar installations.320 
Certain utilities are going into solar as a separate unregulated business 
venture. Dominion Energy announced it is divesting its retail business 
and will focus on a 250 MW solar development target by 2016.321  In 2014, 
Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) and the Edison Electric 
Industry, an electric utility industry trade group, jointly called for a new 
state retail rate structure to reflect more equitable prices based on actual
costs and benefits for distributed renewable energy systems.322  According 
power to customers at the higher retail rate, thus still collecting any payment for
transmission and distribution). 
319. 	  Ken Johnson of the Solar Energy Industries Association stated: 
In a move condemned by many solar companies in Arizona, the state’s largest 
utility, APS, has announced that it will begin installing rooftop solar on customers’ 
homes.  After attacking rooftop solar companies in Arizona relentlessly for more 
than a year, this latest tactic by APS has a “Trojan Horse” smell to it.  Our member
companies welcome fair and equal competition, but this move would stack the 
deck in favor of a company which can rate base solar with a guaranteed rate of
return.  How is that fair?  The Arizona Corporation Commission needs to think 
this through very carefully. 
Id.
320. See N.C. CLEAN ENERGY TECH. CTR., STANDBY & FIXED COST CHARGES AND NET 
ENERGY METERING DEBATES: CURRENT STATUS 1 (Aug. 2014), http://ncclean tech.ncsu. 
edu/wp-content/uploads/State-Status-of-NEM-Standby-+-Fixed-Cost-Charge-Debates_V2.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/29J6-HUQB] (New net-metered rooftop solar systems are charged about 
$4.90 per month as of January 2014). 
321. Zacks Equity Research, Dominion Multiplies Solar Projects, ZACKS INV. RES. 
(Apr. 2, 2014), http://www.zacks.com/stock/news/128536/Dominion-Multiplies-Solar-
Projects [https://perma.cc/7NS2-D86Y].
322. EEI/NRDC Joint Statement To State Utility Regulators, NAT. RES. DEF. COUNCIL
(Feb. 12, 2014), http://docs.nrdc.org/energy/files/ene_14021101a.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
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to the Executive Director of the Harvard Electricity Policy Group, net energy
metering “was simply never a conscious policy decision.  It is basically a
default product of two (no longer relevant) considerations, one practical 
and the other technological.  The practical reason is that residential distributed
generation had such an insignificant presence in the market that its economic
impact was marginal at best.”323 
Governor Baker proposed a change to Massachusetts’ net metering program 
after he took office in 2015.324  Massachusetts has the most far-reaching 
net metering program of all the forty-four states.325  He proposed differentiating
how net metering would be treated before or after the state achieved its 
solar energy target.326  Former Governor Patrick had established a 250 MW
target by 2017 and a 400 MW solar target to be achieved by 2020.327 
When that target was achieved in just three years and then much surpassed, 
Governor Patrick and the Democratically controlled legislature decided to 
quadruple the target to 1600 MW of solar and successively raise the caps
on the amount of net metering allowed for net metering from its original
1% of each utility’s peak load successively until it was 9% of peak load, 
divided between a private and public credit off-taker subset.328 
The affected state utilities and Associated Industries of Massachusetts 
argued that the lost revenue from this most permissive net metering program 
in the country was being invisibly added to the bills of all retail consumers 
as an increased distribution charge, when as a generation component it
had nothing to do with the “distribution” of power to these consumers.329 
The state Department of Public Utilities never made any quantification of 
9DLC-YR7K]; Christopher Martin, NRDC, Utility Group Urge Grid Payments, New Rate 
Structure for Rooftop Solar Users, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 12, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.
com/news/2014-02-12/nrdc-and-u-s-utilities-seek-compensation-for-rooftop-solar-cost.html 
[https://perma.cc/L8A8-9PP9].
323.  Brown & Bunyan, supra note 293, at 31. 
324. See Steve LeBlanc, Governor Baker Files Bill to Encourage Expansion of Solar 
Power, BOS. GLOBE (Aug. 8, 2015), https://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2015/08/07/ 
gov-baker-files-bill-encourage-expansion-solar-power/BbRpLzFy3PBZ2SlUyjGgPP/story.html. 
325. See supra Section II.A. 
326. LeBlanc, supra note 324; H. 3724, 189th Gen. Ct. (Mass. 2015), https://male 
gislature.gov/Bills/189/House/H3724 [https://perma.cc/VB2W-XRTP].
327. FERREY, LAW OF INDEPENDENT POWER, supra note 67, at § 10:115.10; MASS.
DEP’T ENERGY RES., MA RPS SOLAR CARVE-OUT PRICE SUPPORT MECHANISM: PROGRAM
DESIGN AND ANALYSIS DOCUMENT 1–4 (Oct. 23, 2009). 
328. FERREY, LAW OF INDEPENDENT POWER, supra note 67, at § 10:115.10
329. Martin LaMonica, Cape Wind Agrees to Reduce Cost of Offshore Wind, CNET
(Aug. 2, 2010, 7:22 AM), http://www.cnet.com/news/cape-wind-agrees-to-reduce-cost­
of-offshore-wind [https://perma.cc/6HV8-WWJL]; Letter from Robert Rio, Senior Vice 
President & Counsel for Associated Indus. of Mass., to Susan Leavitt, Dep’t of Energy
Res. (Sept. 9, 2009), http://www.mass.gov/eea/docs/doer/renewables/solar/aim-robert­
rio.pdf [https://perma.cc/6TBJ-KDTX].
282
FERREY (DO NOT DELETE) 10/17/2018 1:16 PM     
 
























[VOL. 53:  221, 2016] Net Legal Power 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
the value of solar projects to the system supported by the other 99% of 
retail customers who did not have solar projects.330  Net metering had been
compensated at near the full retail rate for most customers.331 
Most importantly, the state utility regulatory agency would be empowered
to create a fair tariff for net metering transactions.332  This is a critical 
element.  This legislatively established discretion parallels the types of 
recommendations in this Article.  In the Massachusetts’ Governor’s proposal, 
solar units of residential and small commercial size are not affected in the 
net metering credit value that they receive either before or after the target
amount of solar is achieved.  Larger units only receive the current near 
retail rate credit value if they are built before the 1600 MW target is 
saturated.333  For thereafter additional newly constructed units larger than
10 kW single phase or 25 kW three-phase, their net metering credit value
is decreased after the installation target is satisfied.334 
The net metering caps, which had been filled repeatedly, are expanded 
again for additional net metering units by the Baker proposed legislation:  
For private customers the percentage shall not exceed 6% of the distribution 
company’s peak load; and the net metering capacity of net metering facilities 
of a municipality or other governmental entity shall not exceed 7 percent
of the distribution company’s peak load.335 
Governor Baker’s proposed legislation would utilize differentiated
rates, after the state target of 1600 MW of solar was met, thereafter not to 
afford additional net metering units the full retail rate for a service that is
more akin to a wholesale trading transaction.336 
Within the these larger state caps, after the 1600 MW installed solar capacity
target is reached, the generous—near retail value—net metering credits 
are replaced by credits at a reduced market-based value for only additional 
new units constructed thereafter.  This places a premium for early entrants: 
Market-based net metering credit, a credit equal to the excess kilowatt-hours by
time of use billing period, if applicable, multiplied by the average monthly energy
clearing price in the ISO-NE zone in which the net metering facility is located;
provided, however, (i) net metering facilities of a municipality or other governmental
entity, (ii) eligible recipients of credits from net metering facilities serving low
 330.  See supra Section II.A. 
283
331.  Id. 
 332.  H. 3724, 189th Gen. Court. (Mass. 2015). 
333.  Id. 
334.  Id. 
335.  Id. 
336.  Id. 








   
 
      
 
    
  
  
   
        
     
















   
income customers as such customers are defined by the department of energy
resources pursuant to section 11J of chapter 25A, and (iii) eligible recipients of 
credits from community shared net metering, as defined by the department of 
energy resources pursuant to section 11J of chapter 25A, shall receive a credit
equal to the basic service kilowatt-hour charge in the ISO-NE load zone where 
the customer is located.337 
The market rate for power is the wholesale market rate established by 
competition, which rates trades at much less than the full retail rate—the
majority of which can be extra costs for transmission, distribution, and 
taxes—and noticeably less than the retail cost of the commodity sold to 
customers.  The monthly energy price is the time-weighted wholesale price, 
or equivalent to “avoided cost.”338  Conversely, government agencies, low-
income customers, and community net metering receive the basic service
retail component.339  Approximately 40% of the total retail charge is comprised 
of the charge for the actual power commodity—the “basic service” designated
under Massachusetts regulation. For example, while the entire retail rate in
Massachusetts might be $0.16–0.25/kWh based on different rate classes,
the “basic service” electricity commodity charge was approximately $0.09/ 
kWh. At the same point, the market-based wholesale cost of power was
approximately $0.055/kWh.  The regular net metering value, prior to when
the target amount of net metering is installed, is much more.340 
These proposed legislative changes apply time as a variable: Earlier
entrants receive a higher net metering credit value for the identical net
metering of later constructed units after the state quantity target is achieved. 
After the state target is realized, the value of additional net metering units 
depreciates:
	 Smaller units of typical rooftop size continue indefinitely to
realize the full credit value. 
	 Even after the target is achieved, units serving low-income
housing and serving a community of customers continue to 
get a credit value equal to the retail—not wholesale—value 
of the power sold to customers by the utility.  For these 
transactions, the subsidy is the difference in value between
 337. Id.
 338. Avoided Cost, INDEP. ENERGY PRODUCERS ASS’N, http://www.iepa.com/avoid.
asp [https://perma.cc/5JK8-TW7H] (last visited June 2, 2016). 
339.  H. 3724, 189th Gen. Court. (Mass. 2015). 
340. The author’s retail residential bill in the winter of 2015 was $0.25/kWh during 
some of these months, the highest residential rate in the continental U.S.  Net metering at
such a high rate would increase the compensation to the owners of the solar units while it 
commensurately shifted the cost to all other consumers.  Recall also, that Massachusetts
was the only one of the forty-four net metering states, which allowed the credits to be freely
transferred—sold—by the owner of the solar project to other customers of the utility. 
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what the utility could purchase wholesale electricity for and 
what it then charges its retail customers for this power
commodity—the utility forfeits this upcharge and this loss 
is paid by all other retail utility customers. 
 For those net metering who do not fit these categories, their 
net metering credit is equal to the wholesale market transaction 
price as established each month in the New England market.
There is no cross-subsidy, and the value to the net metering
customer is convenience, but not financial gain.341 
In essence, the proposed legislation states that all customers should 
cross-subsidize up to a target saturation, thereafter certain favored customers
should still get a lesser subsidy, while ordinary future net metering customers
should receive no subsidy. While this proposed legislation no longer
clings to the retail rate for all, it instead picks the commodity component 
of the retail rate and the wholesale rate instead.  There is no controversy 
if a state elects to use the wholesale rate, as no state is required to net meter,
and if it does, many states have the utility pay for surplus net metered
power only at the wholesale power rate.  However, the value of net metered 
power to the utility system is the true metric. 
D. The Legal Solution
The law can resolve legal friction, which is now present with net 
metering and climate change initiatives in the U.S. States have a legal
resource and solid precedent that they did not appreciate was available to
justify reasoned and analytic net metering determinations, which few 
states have made or exercised to date.342  States have both an obligation to
do so, and a legal defense if thereafter challenged.  As the U.S. moves to
more sustainable renewable power, a series of well-established precedent
and law requires equitable and precise allocation of the costs of every
power transaction.  Without undertaking this rate analysis and setting costs 
and rates, there is a missing legal link. 
What is established in applicable well-settled law343 is that state public
utility commissions must set fair and equitable rates for every non-wholesale 
transaction of power within their states, at a value reflecting their best
341.  H. 3724, 189th Gen. Court. (Mass. 2015). 
342. See supra Section IV.C. 
343. See supra Section IV. 
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determination of the value of the power transacted.  FERC determined that
net metering is not a sale of wholesale power under certain factual 
conditions.344  State commissions, without determination of value, are on 
thin ice if they set the value of net metered transactions at the retail sale 
rate without any calculation, because net metering is not a retail sale. 
Commissions must make a finding of fact as to the costs and benefits 
of net metering transactions and set net metering transaction values
accordingly.  Such determinations based on legal precedent may result in 
raising or lowering the net meter value compared to the approximate retail
rates that forty-two of forty-four states now afford net metering transactions. 
Once commissions quantify and establish such values, states will be
on more solid legal ground moving forward.  All forty-four net metering 
programs in the states have existed for long enough for each state to have 
done this.
To date, only Minnesota and Maine have made such a principled analytic 
determination.345  This is where each net metering state should follow
Minnesota and Maine, and provide a legal foundation for its programs to
reflect actual benefits, costs, and ratemaking precedent.  Stakeholder 
demands for such a quantitative determination under state ratemaking 
precedent will increase as net metering quickly becomes more pervasive
and total program impacts mount. 
The physics of electricity in the United States will not align with the 
law unless the states connect this missing link.  Legal vulnerabilities call
for solutions: This is critical to meaningfully address climate change and 
protect key U.S. climate policy.  The path outlined in this Article has significant 
immediate legal implications for policymakers.  Timing matters when
dealing with the future of the planet.  With the key 21st Paris Conference
of the Parties on the Kyoto Protocol on climate having concluded with new
urgency to restrain world carbon emissions, the time is now.
 344. See supra Section IV.B. 
345. See supra Section V.C. & n.300. 
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